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THE EVIDENCE RULES THAT CONVICT 
THE INNOCENT 
Jeffrey Bellin† 
Over the past decades, DNA testing has uncovered hun-
dreds of examples of the most important type of trial errors: 
innocent defendants convicted of serious crimes like rape and 
murder.  The resulting Innocence Movement spurred reforms to 
police practices, forensic science, and criminal procedure. 
This Article explores the lessons of the Innocence Movement 
for American evidence law. 
Commentators often overlook the connection between the 
growing body of research on convictions of the innocent and 
the evidence rules. Of the commonly identified causes of false 
convictions, only flawed forensic testimony has received sus-
tained attention as a matter of evidence law.  But other impor-
tant contributors, like mistaken identifications and unreliable 
confessions, also pass through evidence rules.  These path-
ways to admission go unquestioned today but are the result of 
long-forgotten policy choices that were once controversial pre-
cisely because they increase the likelihood of convicting the 
innocent. 
This Article highlights these, and other, overlooked impli-
cations of the Innocence Movement.  It argues that the discov-
ery and ongoing chronicle of hundreds of false convictions 
present a unique opportunity to reevaluate American evidence 
law.  This reevaluation could lead to innocence-protective 
changes to existing evidence rules and a welcome infusion of 
energy into evidence policymaking and commentary. 
† Professor, William & Mary Law School.  Thanks to Ron Allen, Ed Cheng, 
Brandon Garrett, Sandra Mayson, Fred Moss, Mark Spottswood, Maggie Wittlin, 
and the participants in the Vanderbilt Summer Evidence Workshop, and the SMU 
Law School Faculty Forum for comments on an early draft.  Thanks also to Beth-
any Fogerty and Fred Dingledy for research assistance. 
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“The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of 
truth . . . .” 
—United States Supreme Court, 19661 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1923, Judge Learned Hand famously mused that since 
the trial process provides the accused with “every advantage,” 
the prospect of the “innocent man convicted” was “an unreal 
dream.”2  Few observations have aged as badly.  In the past two 
decades, DNA tests definitively established the innocence of 
hundreds of defendants convicted of serious crimes.3  These 
revelations “changed the face of criminal justice.”4  No one 
doubts any longer that the system convicts the innocent.  The 
fight has shifted to the size of the error rate.5 
1 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). 
2 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (“Our procedure 
has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted.  It is an 
unreal dream.”); cf. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J. concur-
ring) (questioning the prevalence of wrongful convictions). 
3 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSE-
CUTIONS GO WRONG 6 (2011). 
4 Id. 
5 Compare Samuel R. Gross, What We Think, What We Know and What We 
Think We Know About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 785 (2017) 
(suggesting a false conviction rate for violent felonies “somewhere in the range 
from one to several percent”), and Charles E. Loeffler, Jordan Hyatt & Greg Ridge-
way, Measuring Self-Reported Wrongful Convictions Among Prisoners, 35 J. QUAN-
TITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 259, 259 (2019) (estimating a six percent wrongful conviction 
rate), with Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reas-
sessing the Conventional Wisdom About the Prevalence of Wrongful Convictions, 60 
ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 847 (2018) (positing a wrongful conviction rate of .016% to 
.062%). See also Marvin Zalman, The Anti-Blackstonians, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 
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The discovery of large swaths of convictions of innocent 
defendants energized reformers in a variety of areas. Indisputa-
ble examples of “false convictions”6 spurred reforms of police 
practices, forensic science, and criminal procedure.7 Relatively 
untouched, however, are the rules of evidence.8  The highly 
influential Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence (Advisory Committee) has proposed few changes in re-
sponse to the “Innocence Movement.”9  A smattering of state 
laws respond to the revelations of the Innocence Movement in 
ways that touch on evidence rules, but these changes serve 
only to illustrate the absence of a more comprehensive reckon-
ing for evidence policy.10 
This Article explores the implications of the Innocence 
Movement for the rules of evidence.  It argues that the discov-
ery and ongoing chronicle of hundreds of false convictions 
1319, 1329 (2018) (“[J]ustice system professionals now accept the regular occur-
rence of a non-trivial number of wrongful convictions.”). 
6 “Confictions,” a term of my own invention, broadly captures these cases, 
which include, “wrong person” cases where “factually innocent persons . . . have 
been convicted of crimes that they did not commit” and “cases where someone is 
convicted for a crime . . . that never actually happened.”  Cassell, supra note 5, at 
818–19; cf. James R. Acker & Catherine L. Bonventre, Protecting the Innocent in 
New York: Moving Beyond Changing Only Their Names, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1250 
(2010) (noting that “innocent” in this context applies “to individuals charged with 
crimes that either never occurred . . . or, more commonly, were committed by 
someone else”).  For a distinction between “false” and “wrongful” convictions, see 
infra text accompanying note 70. 
7 See Brandon L. Garrett, Actual Innocence and Wrongful Convictions, in 3 
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 193, 193 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://law.asu.edu/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-Criminal-Jus-
tice_Vol_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4W8-9UXW] (“Judicial opinions, academic re-
search, criminal procedure reform legislation, changed post-conviction 
standards, new police practices focused on accuracy, new prosecution practices, 
and changes to legal education have all flowed from this focus on innocence.”); see 
also Lara A. Bazelon, The Long Goodbye: After the Innocence Movement, Does the 
Attorney-Client Relationship Ever End?, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 681, 
700–01 (2016) (offering similar assessment). 
8 Typical descriptions of the impact of the Innocence Movement omit refer-
ence to any changes to evidence rules. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
9 The Advisory Committee convened a roundtable to discuss potential 
changes to the rule concerning expert testimony but did not recommend any 
changes. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE SPRING 2019 MEETING 14, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-rules-committees/agenda-
books [https://perma.cc/Q3TZ-FK2K] (postponing consideration of amendment 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in October 2018 “that would prohibit an expert 
from overstating conclusions”).  In recent years, the Committee has made a num-
ber of minor changes, including a few that could be characterized as helping 
defendants. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2019 amendment) (adding a corrobora-
tion requirement for certain statements against interest); infra note 42 (proposing 
changes to notice requirements in Rule 404(b)).  For a summary of the Innocence 
Movement, see Zalman, supra note 5, at 1330–35. 
10 See infra notes 137, 215. 
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presents a unique opportunity to reevaluate evidence doctrine 
and unearth insights, both new and forgotten.  This new lens 
brings out the importance of long neglected evidence rules and 
offers a fresh critique of the theoretical grounding of American 
evidence law. 
*** 
The prosecution of an innocent person is the equivalent of 
a stress test for the criminal justice system.11  The outcome of 
such a proceeding should provide valuable data to evaluate the 
system’s safeguards, including its evidence rules.  Of course, 
researchers cannot ethically conduct this type of test.  But 
America’s accumulation of a growing body of research on false 
convictions provides a second-best alternative.  A comprehen-
sive categorization of the evidence used to convict factually 
innocent defendants can function as a rough audit of the evi-
dence rules.  If the rules are intended to advance the search for 
truth, false convictions shine a light on the rules most in need 
of rethinking. 
As this Article explains, the findings from the false convic-
tion research offer fascinating insights for the rules of evidence. 
The first thing that exoneration data suggest is that, contrary 
to the cynics,12 the evidence rules still play an important and 
direct (not just indirect) role in separating the guilty from the 
innocent.  It is widely recognized that approximately 95 percent 
of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas,13 prompting 
the Supreme Court to observe that plea bargaining “is the crim-
inal justice system.”14  Reports from the Innocence Movement, 
however, highlight one group of defendants that continues to 
rely on trials: the factually innocent.15  The generalizability of 
this observation is clouded by uncertainty, but the evidence we 
have so far suggests that even as most defendants (including 
some innocent defendants) plead guilty, the trial process con-
tinues to be invoked by a significant subset of the defendants it 
11 “Stress tests” are used to assess whether a complex system will fail when it 
encounters challenging conditions. See Christina Parajon Skinner, Misconduct 
Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1598 (2016) (discussing use of “stress testing” of 
financial institutions). 
12 See, e.g., MIRJAN  DAMA˘  LAW  ADRIFT 129 (1997) (describingSKA, EVIDENCE 
evidence rules, in light of the decline of the jury trial, as “more ornamental than 
functional”). 
13 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012). 
14 Id. at 144 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as 
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
15 See infra subpart II.A. 
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was most intended to protect: defendants falsely accused of 
serious crimes.16  The evidence rules governing those trials, 
consequently, maintain a critically important role in a world 
otherwise dominated by guilty pleas.17 
The second thing we learn from the exoneration data is 
that the evidence rules directly implicated in false convictions 
are among the least talked about.  The primary evidentiary con-
tributors18 to false convictions are: (1) mistaken eyewitness 
identifications; (2) flawed forensic expert testimony; (3) unrelia-
ble confessions; and (4) lying jailhouse informants.19  All four of 
these types of evidence pass through a nonconstitutional evi-
16 See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 
339, 352 (2012); infra subpart II.A. 
17 Even if this were not the case, the evidence rules would still play an impor-
tant, albeit indirect, role. See Nora V. Demleitner, More Than “Just” Evidence: 
Reviewing Mirjan Damas̆ka’s Evidence Law Adrift, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 515, 525 
(1999) (“On a practical level, settlements in civil cases and plea-bargaining in 
criminal cases are not necessarily indicative of the irrelevance of evidence law 
since evidentiary rules may determine whether a party will agree to a settlement 
or a plea-bargain.”); infra subpart II.A. 
18 I use the phrases “contributors to” or “correlates of,” rather than the more 
common “causes of” false convictions.  Wrongful conviction researchers have not 
demonstrated that particular items of evidence “caused” false convictions.  In-
stead, they show that certain types of evidence are frequently used, in conjunction 
with other evidence, to obtain false convictions. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Still 
Convicting the Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1490 (2012) (reviewing BRANDON L. 
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE  INNOCENT: WHERE  CRIMINAL  PROSECUTIONS  GO  WRONG 
(2011)) (highlighting “the near impossibility of isolating and assessing the signifi-
cance of any single factor in a given case”).  As a result, it seems more accurate to 
talk about evidentiary “correlates” or “contributors,” rather than “causes,” of false 
convictions.  This point should not be controversial, as it is widely acknowledged 
that “cause” in this context is intended to be understood more broadly than 
typical usage would suggest. See Gross, supra note 5, at 769 (“When we talk 
about ‘causes’ of false conviction we usually mean facts in particular cases that 
increase the probability that an innocent defendant will be convicted by providing 
misleading evidence of guilt or concealing evidence of innocence.”). 
19 See Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Pro-
cess and Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 727 (2013) 
(identifying as leading contributors to wrongful convictions “eyewitness identifica-
tions, confessions, forensic science, and jailhouse informant or snitch testi-
mony”); Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: Judicial 
Sanctions for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893, 2928 (2009) 
(“Based on numerous national and state-wide studies conducted since 1996, four 
categories of admissible evidence have emerged as the leading causes of wrongful 
convictions: (1) eyewitness identifications; (2) non-DNA forensic analysis of physi-
cal evidence; (3) testimony of jailhouse informants; and (4) confessions obtained 
during custodial interrogations.” (footnotes omitted)); Fiona Leverick, Kathryn 
Campbell & Isla Callander, Post-Conviction Review: Questions of Innocence, Inde-
pendence, and Necessity, 47 STETSON L. REV. 45, 47 n.6 (2017) (“There is a re-
markable consensus that the main evidential causes of wrongful conviction are 
mistaken eyewitness identification, false confessions, misleading forensic evi-
dence and the evidence of accomplices or informers (or others who have a motiva-
tion to lie).”). 
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dence rule intended to ensure reliability.  For one category, the 
implicated rule is obvious.  Expert testimony is admitted in 
every jurisdiction through evidence rules (and legal doctrines) 
that are heavily scrutinized by courts and scholars.20  But 
apart from expert testimony, the evidence rules most impli-
cated in false convictions—essentially hearsay exceptions—fly 
so far under the radar that most commentators fail to notice 
them at all.21  The absence of any modern controversy regard-
ing the wisdom of these rules obscures a fascinating history. 
These evidence rules are the result of long-forgotten policy 
choices that were once controversial precisely because they 
increase the likelihood of convicting the innocent.22 
The cases that spur the Innocence Movement illustrate the 
consequences of these long-forgotten evidence policy choices. 
For example, commentators expressed disbelief that federal 
and state courts rejected challenges to the admission of 
Brendan Dassey’s confession, profiled in the television series, 
Making a Murderer.23  As described by a dissenting judge: 
20 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring judges to screen expert testimony to 
ensure that it is “the product of reliable principles and methods” that have been 
“reliably applied . . . to the facts of the case”); Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, 
Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 471, 503 (2005) (suggesting that “courts apply some generalized level of 
scrutiny when considering the reliability of scientific evidence, regardless of the 
governing standard.”); Brandon L. Garrett & M. Chris Fabricant, The Myth of the 
Reliability Test, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1571 (2018) (critiquing state and fed-
eral courts for failing to rigorously assess reliability of expert testimony despite 
Rule 702’s command). 
21 See, e.g., Findley, supra note 19, at 754, 763 (“Alone among the prominent 
contributors to wrongful convictions, the problematic nature of expert testimony 
is explicitly addressed by the rules of evidence . . . . There are no rules that 
uniquely address the unreliability of eyewitness identifications, snitch testimony, 
or confessions.”).  There is only sporadic discussion of this point in the literature. I 
located only two examples that recognize the applicability of rules of evidence to 
wrongful conviction correlates like confessions and eyewitness identifications. See 
Richard A. Leo, Peter J. Neufeld, Steven A. Drizin & Andrew E. Taslitz, Promoting 
Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability 
Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 816 (2013); 
Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Tes-
timony, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 389 (2012). 
22 See infra subpart II.B. 
23 See Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 317 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(summarizing state court proceedings and refusing relief on collateral attack); 
Adam Liptak, Was It a False Confession in ‘Making a Murderer’? The Supreme 
Court May Decide, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
06/11/us/politics/supreme-court-making-a-murderer.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9PE5-92LJ] (“[M]any people were made powerfully uneasy by the treatment of . . . 
Brendan Dassey, whose videotaped interrogation was among the most gripping 
parts of the series.”); Laura Nirider & Steven Drizin, False Confessions Drive the 
True Crime TV Craze, But It’s Time To End the Spectacle, CHI. TRIBUNE (Aug. 9, 
2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-true-
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Psychological coercion, questions to which the police fur-
nished the answers, and ghoulish games of ‘20 Questions,’ in 
which Brendan Dassey guessed over and over again before he 
landed on the ‘correct’ story (i.e., the one the police wanted), 
led to the ‘confession’ that furnished the only serious evi-
dence supporting his murder conviction in the Wisconsin 
courts.24 
The outrage is understandable.  While the evaluation of the 
credibility of relevant evidence is typically left to the jury,25 
there are good reasons to expect evidence law to exclude unreli-
able confessions like Dassey’s.  An out-of-court confession 
must pass through the hearsay rules, which ostensibly screen 
for reliability.26  Indeed, American judges once demanded ro-
bust trustworthiness guarantees for hearsay confessions that 
would have excluded precisely this type of evidence.27  But over 
the past 150 years, courts and evidence rule drafters gradually 
replaced the evidence rules that screened for reliability with 
constitutional protections that focus only on process.28  Today, 
these process-focused constitutional protections are all that 
remain.29  Dassey’s confession was not admitted because it 
was reliable.  It was admitted because the sixteen-year-old was 
read his rights.30 
crime-television-false-confessions-20190809-ejtzggbu3rgkzj7fjazipye37u-
story.html [https://perma.cc/7GFT-THAA] (“Dassey sits in a Wisconsin prison to 
this day because a court held that the law does not clearly prohibit the tactics 
used against him — even though viewers around the globe were outraged by what 
they saw on his interrogation videotape.”). 
24 Dassey, 877 F.3d at 319 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
25 See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note, at 405 
(“For a judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it has been de-
scribed as ‘altogether atypical, extraordinary . . .’); Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 7, 48 (2013) (“A witness’s credibility, however, is typically a jury 
question . . . .”). 
26 See ILL. R. EVID. 801(c), 802 (defining “hearsay” as “a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted” and prohibiting its admission 
absent a specified exception); see also FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c), 802 (same); State v. 
Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 807 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (“[T]he hearsay rules are at the 
core of the judicial function: defining what is reliable evidence and establishing 
judicial processes to test reliability.”); FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s 
introductory note, at 405 (explaining traditional approach to hearsay as, “a gen-
eral rule excluding hearsay but subject to numerous exceptions under circum-
stances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness,” and adopting that 
approach for “these [i.e., the federal] rules”); infra section II.B.2. 
27 See infra section II.B.2. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Dassey, 877 F.3d at 306, 312 (emphasizing that Dassey “was given Mi-
randa warnings and understood them sufficiently”); cf. Fare v. Michael C., 442 
U.S. 707, 727 (1979) (rejecting challenge to confession where “the police took care 
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Purported confessions to informants—another prominent 
evidentiary contributor to false convictions—face even fewer 
hurdles.31  For example, at Bruce Lisker’s trial for murdering 
his mother, a jailhouse informant testified that Lisker con-
fessed to the killing when they were both detained in Los Ange-
les County Jail.  The informant claimed this happened, “during 
their very first conversation,” through a hole in the wall be-
tween their pretrial detention cells, “before they even knew 
each other’s names.”32  Again, this testimony communicated 
an out-of-court statement to the jury to prove the matter as-
serted by the out-of-court speaker.33  Consequently, it had to 
pass through the reliability-focused hearsay rules.34  But the 
only surviving requirement for admission of this evidence in 
California, and in jurisdictions across the country, is that the 
statement relayed to the jury by the informant was (purport-
edly) uttered by the defendant and offered by the prosecution.35 
As far as the modern evidence rules are concerned, there is no 
question that this type of informant testimony is admissible; 
and little controversy among evidence scholars, courts, or 
policymakers over the (evidence) rules that ensure that result. 
Not surprisingly, the informant’s testimony in Lisker’s case 
to inform [the sixteen-year-old] respondent of his rights and to ensure that he 
understood them”).  Reading rights would be insufficient, of course, if the police 
did not honor those rights and, for example, went on to employ physical coercion 
to extract a statement. Fare, 442 U.S. at 727.  But, again, the analysis would turn 
on the process of extracting the confession, not its reliability. See id. 
31 See infra section II.B.3. 
32 Scott Glover & Matt Lait, From the Archives: New Light on a Distant Verdict, 
L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2005, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-
lisker22may22-story.html [https://perma.cc/DT4F-4G28]. 
33 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a)–(b) (West 2020) (defining hearsay as “evi-
dence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the 
hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated,” and barring its 
admission, absent an exception). 
34 Id.; see supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
35 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1220 (West 2020) (“Evidence of a statement is not 
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an 
action to which he is a party in either his individual or representative capacity, 
regardless of whether the statement was made in his individual or representative 
capacity.”).  California’s Evidence Code also requires that the evidence be admissi-
ble under the State and federal constitution. CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1204. Some 
jurisdictions require corroboration for informant testimony, but such regulation 
is sporadic. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE ERO-
SION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 177 (2009) (characterizing existing legislative restrictions 
as “largely piecemeal” and proposing additional restrictions); Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Prosecuting the Informant Culture, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2011) 
(“[C]ompared to many other areas of the criminal justice system, snitching goes 
largely unregulated.”). 
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turned out to be false.36  But that discovery came much too 
late.  Lisker served twenty-six years in prison before the prose-
cution’s case fell apart, and the State dropped the charges.37 
Out-of-court identifications—the most commonly cited 
contributor to false convictions—are similarly admissible 
under the evidence rules without any assessment of reliability. 
For example, the Court of Appeals of Texas rejected Andrew 
William Gossett’s (truthful) claim of mistaken identification by 
highlighting police testimony that the victim “identified appel-
lant as her assailant in the photographic line-up so fast that it 
surprised the officer.”38  That evidence was hearsay,39 but its 
admissibility was a foregone conclusion.  Under the Texas 
Rules of Evidence, like the Federal Rules, the only requirement 
for admission of an out-of-court statement of identification is 
that the declarant testify and is subject to cross-examination.40 
These three examples illustrate one of the most remarkable 
lessons policymakers can take from the research on false con-
victions.  The evidence rules play as prominent a role in the 
flawed convictions unearthed by the Innocence Movement as 
any of the more widely-criticized levers of the criminal justice 
system.  And yet the implicated rules escape notice both in 
debates about wrongful convictions and critiques of evidence 
policy generally. 
The third insight the false conviction data present is just as 
striking as the first two: the evidence rules that modern com-
mentators do single out for criticism do not seem to be impli-
cated at all.41  The most famous, and famously reviled, 
evidence rules—such as the highly contentious pathway for the 
admission of prior crimes evidence,42 or the much-maligned 
36 See Lisker v. Knowles, 651 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Full 
Coverage: The Case [sic] of Bruce Lisker, L.A. TIMES (March 20, 2015, 12:54 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/la-me-lisker-sg-storygallery.html [https://perma.cc/ 
AKH8-TEW3]. 
37 Full Coverage: The Case of Bruce Lisker, supra note 36. 
38 Gossett v. State, No. 13-00-166-CR, 2001 WL 997400, at *3–4 (Tex. App. 
Apr. 12, 2001). 
39 See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c) (defining hearsay as an out-of-court statement 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement); infra section 
II.B.1. 
40 TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(C); see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C). 
41 See infra subpart II.C. 
42 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  The Advisory Committee recently proposed 
changes to Rule 404(b)’s notice requirements. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES 
OF  EVIDENCE  SPRING 2019 MEETING, supra note 9, at 24.  The controversial rule 
permitting impeachment with prior convictions, FED. R. EVID. 609, does appear to 
play at least an indirect role in enabling false convictions. See infra section II.B.3. 
The Advisory Committee rejected a modest reform to Rule 609 in 2018. See 
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hearsay exceptions for “excited utterances,” “coconspirator 
statements,” and “dying declarations”—are, so far, conspicu-
ously absent from the false conviction narratives.43  The revela-
tions of the Innocence Movement suggest that courts, 
litigators, and scholars expend the bulk of their energy fighting 
about the wrong rules. 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I proposes a 
methodology for using exoneration data to audit the evidence 
rules.  Part II analyzes the results.  After highlighting the ongo-
ing importance of trials in this context, the discussion focuses 
on three areas: (1) now-uncontroversial evidence rules that 
mechanically usher in the evidence used to convict the inno-
cent; (2) largely-forgotten historical controversies regarding 
these rules that bear revisiting in light of modern research into 
the causes of false convictions; and (3) the stark contrast be-
tween the rarely-discussed rules that enable false convictions 
and the evidence rules that draw lots of attention, but play little 
role.  Part III explores the implications of the preceding discus-
sion.  At this point, the goal of the discussion is not to argue for 
specific rule changes.  Rather, my aim is to propose a shift of 
scholars’ and policymakers’ attention.  If fostering the accuracy 
of trial outcomes is the primary goal of the evidence rules, we 
need to turn our collective attention to the rules that convict 
the innocent. 
I 
TESTING THE EVIDENCE RULES 
Any audit requires a clear methodology and a recognition 
of underlying assumptions.  This Part maps out these ele-
ments.  It begins by proposing accuracy or, more precisely, the 
ability to foster accurate verdicts, as the appropriate metric for 
testing the evidence rules.  It then describes the data we have 
on false convictions and explores ways we can use this data to 
test the evidence rules for accuracy. 
A. The Case for Accuracy 
The modern law of evidence is one of the most intricate and 
thoughtful endeavors in American jurisprudence.  Expert bod-
ies constituted at the federal and state levels draft carefully 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FALL 2018 MEETING 55–57 (Minutes of 
the Committee Meeting of April 26–27, 2018) https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/2018-10-evidence-agenda-book_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/34QV-
HYVZ]. 
43 See infra subpart II.C. 
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nuanced rules, typically with only moderate interference from 
legislatures.44  Most law students take an “Evidence” course to 
learn how those rules work, and the topic is tested on the Bar 
Examinations required to practice law.45  Judicial opinions, 
law review articles, and treatises carefully interpret the rules. 
Out in the “real world,” trial courts consider evidentiary objec-
tions, and apply the rules to exclude or admit evidence, subject 
to later appeal.  Notably absent from this admirable enterprise, 
however, is any effort to evaluate whether the evidence rules 
work. 
Even the question seems foreign.  What would it mean for 
an evidence rule to “work”?  An answer requires an assessment 
of the rule’s function.  The primary end sought through the 
evidence rules and accompanying trial process is factual accu-
racy.46  The Federal Rules of Evidence themselves announce a 
“purpose” of “ascertaining the truth and securing a just deter-
mination.”47  The States largely copy this formulation;48 judges 
and scholars echo it as well.49  Consequently, it seems fairly 
44 See Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking”, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 846–56 (2002) (chronicling the creation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence).  For a state example, see CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOM-
MENDATION PROPOSING AN EVIDENCE CODE 3–9 (1965), http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/ 
Printed-Reports/Pub060.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEX6-EADR] (setting forth the 
membership of the committees proposing the code and the comprehensive code 
itself). 
45 See Preparing for the MBE, MULTISTATE  BAR  EXAMINATION http:// 
www.ncbex.org/exams/mbe/preparing/ [https://perma.cc/3A5Z-KCM9] (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2020) (listing “Evidence” as one of the seven subject areas tested 
on the MBE); see also Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute, 
and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 914, 915 (1994) 
(“The evidence class plays a special role in bringing students into the 
profession.”). 
46 See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The 
basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth . . . .”). 
47 FED. R. EVID. 102 (Purpose). 
48 See, e.g., OHIO  EVID. R. 102 (“The purpose of these rules is to provide 
procedures for the adjudication of causes to the end that the truth may be ascer-
tained and proceedings justly determined.”). 
49 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2007) (“Scholars and policymakers thus overwhelm-
ingly view evidentiary rules in criminal law as geared primarily toward accuracy in 
fact-finding.”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinations: Inter-
pretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 590 (1996) (“[T]he 
evidence rules have as their prime purpose the advancement of the accuracy of 
the truth-determination process of our trials . . . .”); Dale A. Nance, Reliability and 
the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 194 (2003) (“Evidence, or 
the rules regulating evidence, may be said to be more or less veritistic, more or 
less conducive to accurate verdicts.”); Michael S. Pardo, Evidence Theory and the 
NAS Report on Forensic Science, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 367, 369, 372 (explaining that 
theoretical accounts of evidence law “aim to either justify or to reform evidentiary 
rules or practices in light of their tendencies to produce true (factually accurate) 
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uncontroversial to suggest that the chief (although not sole) 
purpose of the evidentiary project is to screen out evidence that 
will distract or overwhelm the jury, and thus jeopardize the 
likelihood of a factually accurate verdict.50  Apart from a few 
rules that can best be understood as having been repurposed 
to achieve discrete policy goals (for example, attorney-client 
privilege),51 the evidence rules all seem to strive to this end.52 
For better or for worse, we try through the rules to facilitate a 
jury’s ability to reach the verdict that most closely parallels the 
underlying facts.53  In the criminal context, then, the evidence 
rules “work” when they help juries distinguish the factually 
innocent from the factually guilty.  Of course, the litigation pro-
cess serves other goals as well.  Fairness is important.  And 
appearances matter.54  But even if accuracy is not the only 
goal, it is the one that matters most. 
outcomes or produce false (factually erroneous) outcomes” and noting that these 
accounts are “relatively uncontroversial”); infra note 53. 
50 See supra text accompanying note 49. 
51 See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 
420 (1991) (“Most privilege rules are designed to sacrifice truth-seeking to other 
values, and thus they are indifferent to the comparison of the conventional view of 
the proof rules and the equally well specified cases proposal.”); Frederick Schauer, 
On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 
167–68 (2006) (“Privileges, for example, do not purport to serve epistemic 
goals . . . . Such rules are the exception, however, and most of the exclusionary 
rules are designed with the jury in mind and with the goal of increasing the 
accuracy and efficiency of fact finding under circumstances of jury decision mak-
ing.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 407 (policy-based rule banning introduction of subse-
quent remedial measures). 
52 Some rules, like Rule 403 can be viewed as directed toward fairness, but 
fairness, in this context, is explicitly conceptualized as a fair opportunity to point 
the jury toward the factually accurate outcome. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory 
committee’s note (“ ‘Unfair prejudice’ within its context means an undue tendency 
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an 
emotional one.”). 
53 See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPIS-
TEMOLGY 2 (2006) (“Judges and legal scholars have insisted repeatedly and em-
phatically that the most fundamental of these values is . . . finding out whether an 
alleged crime actually occurred and, if so, who committed it.”); Ronald J. Allen & 
Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 
NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1132 (1993) (describing process as an effort to “settl[e] upon 
the most plausible account of what actually happened”). Scholars often criticize 
evidence law’s deviation from truth seeking, but in doing so generally accept the 
premise that the rules should focus on facilitating accuracy. See, e.g., Julia 
Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 225 (2017) (“Until we 
find a better way to look for liars, we should discard the practice and focus on 
looking for lies.”); supra text accompanying note 49. 
54 See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the 
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985) (“The aim of the 
factfinding process is not to generate mathematically ‘probable’ verdicts, but 
rather to generate acceptable ones; only an acceptable verdict will project the 
underlying legal rule to society and affirm the rule’s behavioral norm.”). 
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Over the years, it has been easy to overlook the need to 
accuracy-test the rules of evidence because such testing 
seemed impossible.  One cannot discern by observing trials 
and appeals whether the evidence rules work.  This is because 
we usually lack any ability, independent of the trial itself, to 
assess whether verdicts are factually correct.55  Eleanor Swift 
detailed this problem in 1987: “The goal of achieving accurate 
outcomes should not be the sole basis for choosing evidence 
rules since it cannot be ever determined which rules produce 
accurate outcomes, or even reliable items of evidence.”56 
Things have changed.  We have long awaited an indepen-
dent means of evaluating the factual accuracy of verdicts. 
Post-conviction DNA testing provides that opportunity. 
In fact, the false conviction data seems so well suited to a 
reexamination of the evidence rules, that the absence of a more 
robust discussion along these lines is surprising.57  When lead-
ing voices in this area offer observations like, “Few rules, how-
ever, regulate accuracy rather than procedures.  Such matters 
are typically committed to the discretion of the trial judge,”58 
they overlook the field of Evidence.  The evidence rules care a 
great deal about accuracy.  It is time to introduce those rules to 
the Innocence Movement.59 
B. Using False Conviction Data to Audit the Evidence 
Rules 
The discovery of hundreds of false convictions provides a 
means to audit the evidence rules for accuracy.  Specifically, we 
can use this data to identify the evidence pathways used to 
55 “There is no general test for the accuracy of criminal convictions.”  Samuel 
R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 175 (2008). 
56 Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 
1339, 1361 (1987); see also id. at 1366–67 (“Truth, if viewed as the correspon-
dence between outcomes and actual past events, cannot legitimate results.”).  The 
difficulty is exacerbated in cases where even DNA-type evidence cannot solve a 
factual dispute, such as with an assessment of culpable recklessness. Cf. Allen, 
supra note 51, at 393–94 (“Mental states are endemic to the western concept of 
legal rights and obligations, and thus are central to litigation; and questions 
concerning mental states are not well-formed in the sense meant above, nor do 
they lend themselves to testing through replicable experiments.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
57 Cf. Findley, supra note 19, at 725 (“[N]ew understandings about wrongful 
convictions warrant re-examining the constitutional and evidentiary rules that 
have developed over time based upon assumptions about reliability and the effec-
tiveness of those rules and trial processes.”). 
58 GARRETT, supra note 3, at 8. 
59 Cf. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 303 (1998) (“State and federal 
rulemakers therefore have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish 
rules excluding evidence.”). 
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convict the innocent.  To the extent these pathways purport to 
screen out unreliable evidence, they failed.60 
The methodology suggested here is not perfect.  For exam-
ple, it only screens for one type of inaccuracy: false convictions. 
It says little about another type of inaccuracy, “false acquit-
tals.”61  In addition, the mechanism for DNA exonerations has 
been sporadic and ad hoc.62  Shortcomings aside, it is also 
important to emphasize the unique opportunity DNA exonera-
tions offer to those who study law.  In one respect, these exon-
erations are better than clinical experiments.  DNA 
exonerations are not just single-, double- or triple-blind. No 
one knows when these “experiments” will occur.  In most cases, 
only after the jury reaches its verdict, and the appeals process 
runs its course, do the lawyers and judges learn that the ac-
cused was factually innocent.  Not only does this tragic phe-
nomenon provide a way to review what went wrong, it may be a 
singular moment in the history of criminal justice.  The bulk of 
false convictions came to light through challenges to verdicts 
that predated the era of widespread DNA testing.63  Now that 
DNA testing is widely available, we can expect fewer post-con-
viction DNA exonerations.  Suspects can now be cleared by 
DNA testing before trial.  That is a good thing in every respect, 
except one.  It signals an end to our unintended stress testing 
of the trial process.  Whatever lessons are to be learned, we 
need to learn them now. 
On to the details.  There is no official source of data on false 
convictions.  Instead, there are a few studies.  Legal scholar 
Brandon Garrett conducted one of the most-cited studies of 
60 Cf. Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21, at 777 (“[C]riminal trials 
overwhelmingly fail as a safeguard for protecting innocent false confessors from 
the fate of wrongful conviction and incarceration.”).  It is possible that evidence 
rules “work” by allowing factually accurate information to be presented to the 
jury, even in cases that result in false convictions.  This Article need not wade into 
that complexity, however, because of the dichotomous types of evidence called 
into question by the false conviction research.  When a defendant is later exoner-
ated by DNA evidence, a positive eyewitness identification introduced at trial, as 
well as any confession relayed by police or jailhouse informants, necessarily 
pointed the jury to the factually inaccurate verdict. 
61 See Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 65, 85 (2008) (“Reading the pertinent literature, one might think that wrong-
ful acquittals never occur.”); Marvin Zalman & Matthew Larson, Elephants in the 
Station House: Serial Crimes, Wrongful Convictions, and Expanding Wrongful Con-
viction Analysis to Include Police Investigation, 79 ALB. L. REV. 941, 943 n.10 
(2015) (“A wrongful acquittal is as equally inaccurate as a false conviction.”). 
62 See infra supbart II.A. 
63 See Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, 48–49, 53, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION (Daniel S. Medwed ed. 2017). 
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DNA exonerations for his 2011 book, Convicting the Innocent.64 
Garrett updated this study in 2017, adding eighty DNA exoner-
ations that occurred after 2011.65  By providing examples 
where a guilty verdict directly clashes with the defendant’s fac-
tual innocence, Garrett’s collection of over 360 cases offers 
valuable raw material with which to test the evidence rules for 
accuracy.66 
There is another, ongoing study of wrongful convictions 
curated by University of Michigan Law School: The National 
Registry of Exonerations (NRE).  “The National Registry of Ex-
onerations reports every known exoneration in the United 
States since 1989, a total of 2,265 as of August 29, 2018.”67 
The NRE is not limited to DNA exonerations.68  The criteria for 
inclusion on the NRE is as follows: 
“Exoneration” . . . means that a defendant who was convicted 
of a crime was later relieved of all legal consequences of that 
conviction through a decision by a prosecutor, a governor or 
a court, after new evidence of his or her innocence was 
discovered.69 
As the above-quoted definition indicates, the NRE includes 
some cases that may only represent “wrongful” (legally flawed) 
as opposed to “false” (factually inaccurate) convictions.70  For 
example, over 200 of the cases in the registry involve defend-
ants who were convicted, but then received new trials and were 
64 GARRETT, supra note 3. 
65 Garrett, supra note 63, at 44. Garrett’s database can be accessed at the 
following link: https://www.convictingtheinnocent.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
49BB-F4MJ].  Garrett’s database of cases is drawn from the Cardozo Innocence 
Project, which lists all collected wrongful conviction cases here: https:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/ [https://perma.cc/4ML9-P5F5]. 
66 See DNA Exoneration Database, CONVICTING THE  INNOCENT, https:// 
www.convictingtheinnocent.com/ [https://perma.cc/49BB-F4MJ] (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2020). 
67 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, MILESTONE: EXONERATED DEFENDANTS SPENT 
20,000 YEARS IN  PRISON 2 (2018), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera-
tion/Documents/NRE.20000.Years.Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7RN-2B3E] 
68 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2018, at 5 (2019), http:// 
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonera-
tions%20in%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3SQ-5QGW] (“Overall, DNA exoner-
ations now account for 20% of the exonerations in the Registry through 2018 
(484/2,372).”). 
69 SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1989–2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 7 (2012), http:// 
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonera-
tions_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L26J-9BK8]. 
70 Cf. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 195 (2006) (Scalia, J. concurring) 
(critiquing broad criteria for exoneration in Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, 
Daniel J. Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata Patil, Exonerations in the 
United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 529 (2005)). 
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acquitted.71  These defendants’ legal innocence is settled, but 
their factual innocence remains at least arguable.  At the same 
time, the NRE presents a larger data sample and a broader 
reflection of the American criminal justice system. DNA exoner-
ations from the past decades typically occur in cases of sexual 
violence and murder.72  The NRE includes those cases, but also 
a wide variety of other cases, like drug crimes or robberies, that 
do not typically involve DNA evidence.73 
Both Garrett’s DNA exoneration studies and the NRE’s 
broader collection of exonerations are valuable for our pur-
poses.  In particular, both endeavor to determine “what went 
wrong”74 by identifying patterns in the cases that culminate in 
convictions of the innocent.  Those findings have been distilled 
into a familiar, “canonical list” of the primary contributors to 
later-overturned convictions.75  While there are distinctions be-
tween the NRE and Garrett’s data, both data sets agree on the 
evidentiary contributors to false convictions that belong on that 
list: “eyewitness misidentification, flawed scientific evidence, 
informant testimony, [and] false confessions.”76 
71 NAT’L  REGISTRY OF  EXONERATIONS, THE  FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS 3 (2015), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/1600_Exonera-
tions.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6V4-538F]. 
72 See GARRETT, supra note 3, at 217–18. 
73 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 71, at 3–4. 
74 GARRETT, supra note 3. 
75 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 25 (Gerald Uelmen 
& Chris Boscia eds., 2008), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?referer=httpsredir=1&article=1000&context=ncippubs [https:// 
perma.cc/P9LH-R92Q] (“The most frequently identified causal factors include mi-
sidentification by eyewitnesses, false confessions, perjured testimony, mishan-
dling of forensic evidence, withholding exculpatory evidence, and the 
incompetence of defense lawyers.”); FLA. INNOCENCE COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
SUPREME  COURT OF  FLORIDA 17 (2012), https://www.flcourts.org/content/ 
download/218230/1975326/Innocence-Report-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WR3Z-DDT5] (“During the two years of its existence, the Commission identified 
five causes for wrongful convictions: Eyewitness identification, false confessions, 
informants and jailhouse snitches, improper/invalid scientific evidence, and pro-
fessional responsibility.”); Gross, supra note 55, at 186 (“There is a canonical list 
of factors that lead to false convictions: eyewitness misidentification; false confes-
sion; misleading, false, or fraudulent forensic evidence; testimony by highly moti-
vated police informants such as “jailhouse snitches”; perjury in general; 
prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective legal defense.”); Laurin, supra note 18, at 
1478 (recognizing the “key evidentiary pathologies that emerge from the dataset,” 
include “eyewitness misidentification, flawed scientific evidence, informant testi-
mony, false confessions, and weak defenses,” which “are consistent with the 
‘canonical’ list of factors” that appear in the work “of every . . . scholar of wrongful 
convictions”). 
76 Laurin, supra note 18, at 1478 (recognizing that the “key evidentiary 
pathologies that emerge from the dataset” include “eyewitness misidentification, 
flawed scientific evidence, informant testimony, false confessions, and weak de-
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In sum, we have a valuable sample of cases to study.  It is 
not a random sample77 and we must be wary of drawing 
broader lessons than are warranted.  But the sample has much 
going for it.  It is a sample of case evidence policymakers should 
care deeply about: innocent defendants convicted of serious 
crimes.  This may be an imperfect audit, but it is as good a tool 
as we have ever possessed to try to determine whether the 
evidence rules work. 
II. 
THE RESULTS 
This Part reports the “results” of the American criminal 
justice system’s unintentional stress test of the evidence rules 
and explores their implications.  It strives to use the exonera-
tion data to assess how the evidence rules fared.  As discussed 
below, the results are instructive not only with respect to the 
rules implicated in false convictions, but also for those that 
appear to play little role.  Perhaps most importantly, the dis-
cussion exhumes largely-forgotten policy choices that facilitate 
false convictions.  Modern courts, scholars and policymakers 
troubled by the conviction of the innocent should be eager to 
revisit these choices. 
A. The Evidence Rules Remain Important 
The typical argument for the ongoing importance of evi-
dence rules in a system dominated by pretrial settlement is 
that the rules indirectly influence negotiated outcomes.  Since 
criminal defendants and prosecutors weigh the benefits of a 
guilty plea against a trial alternative, the admissibility of evi-
dence (and thus the evidence rules) plays an important role in 
influencing the parties’ plea negotiations, even if few trials ac-
tually occur.78 
The false conviction data supports a more direct argument 
for the importance of evidence rules.  Existing exoneration data 
presents a particularly striking contrast between the typical 
defendant and the factually innocent defendant.  Innocent de-
fendants appear to go to trial more frequently.  Ninety-five per-
fenses,” which “are consistent with the ‘canonical’ list of factors” that appear in 
the work “of every . . . scholar of wrongful convictions.”). 
77 See infra subpart II.A. 
78 See Demleitner, supra note 17 (“[S]ettlements in civil cases and plea-bar-
gaining in criminal cases are not necessarily indicative of the irrelevance of evi-
dence law since evidentiary rules may determine whether a party will agree to a 
settlement or a plea-bargain.”). 
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cent of convictions result from guilty pleas.79  In the data we 
have so far, that number plummets to 17 percent of the convic-
tions of those later exonerated (the NRE), and only 8 percent for 
those later proven innocent by DNA testing.80 
The statistical evidence regarding innocence and guilty 
pleas is both critically important for modern criminal justice 
debates and clouded with uncertainty.  There are reasons to 
credit the evidence and reasons to treat it warily.81  Let’s start 
with the reasons for caution.  Guilty plea rates vary by offense. 
The types of crimes that typically lead to DNA exonerations 
have lower guilty plea rates (rape, 83 percent and murder, 69 
percent).82  Still, even adjusting for offense type, innocent de-
fendants appear to go to trial far more frequently.83 
Other reasons for caution include the ad hoc nature of the 
exoneration process.  It takes time, resources, and expertise to 
overturn a conviction, and these commodities are finite.  All 
things being equal, we should expect advocates to focus on 
defendants convicted after trial rather than those who plead 
guilty.  Defendants who plead guilty typically receive shorter 
sentences than those convicted at trial.84  An already released 
or soon to be released defendant will be a lower priority for 
79 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty 
pleas”). 
80 GARRETT, supra note 3, at 150 (“6% of the exonerees (16 of 250) pleaded 
guilty”); Garrett, supra note 63, at 44 (8 percent in 2017 update); Gross, supra 
note 5, at 756 (“17% pled guilty, 67% were convicted at trial by juries and 7% were 
convicted by judges”). 
81 See John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Inno-
cent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 180 (2014) (noting 
that “factually innocent defendants may plead guilty because they are afraid that 
they will be punished (often quite severely) for exercising their Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial.”). 
82 GARRETT, supra note 3, at 151. 
83 The exoneration data overwhelmingly consider serious cases.  It says little 
about the likelihood of guilty pleas in minor cases where, for example, a detained 
defendant can face a choice between a lengthy delay pending trial and a guilty 
plea that results in immediate release. See, e.g., Laura Sullivan, Inmates Who 
Can’t Make Bail Face Stark Options, NPR (Jan. 22, 2010, 12:00 AM), https:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725819 [https:// 
perma.cc/A466-HJYY] (describing intense pressures on defendants to obtain re-
lease through a plea bargain prior rather than wait for trial). 
84 See Jeffrey Bellin, Attorney Competence in an Age of Plea Bargaining and 
Econometrics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 153, 157 (2014) (analyzing empirical study of 
murder defendants in Philadelphia and noting that for similarly situated cases, 
“[d]efendants who are convicted after trial are typically convicted of more serious 
charges . . . and receive lengthier sentences”). 
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exoneration efforts.85  In addition, the act of pleading guilty 
generates legal and rhetorical obstacles to subsequent claims 
of innocence.86 
While there are reasons to weigh the relative frequency of 
reports of post-trial (as opposed to post-guilty-plea) exonera-
tions warily, there are reasons to believe the imbalance reflects 
an underlying truth.87  When accused of a serious crime, an 
innocent defendant should be more reluctant to plead guilty, a 
process that typically requires the defendant to formally admit 
guilt while under oath in front of media, family, and victims.88 
Innocent defendants should also possess inflated optimism 
about the prospects for acquittal. The trial process is a test of 
the prosecution’s evidence.  A factually innocent defendant 
should be more optimistic than a guilty defendant that the 
prosecution’s evidence will fail.89 
It is also important to note the extreme contrast presented 
in the data.  There is a substantial gap between the rates of 
conviction by guilty plea (as opposed to trial) for all defendants 
(95 percent), and the rate of conviction by guilty plea (as op-
posed to trial) for convicted defendants who are subsequently 
cleared by DNA testing (8 percent).90  The raw numbers make 
this imbalance even more striking.  For example, in the federal 
system in 2016, almost 64,000 defendants pled guilty to felony 
charges while only about 1,500 were convicted after trial.91  In 
Texas in that same year, 101,598 convictions resulted from a 
85 A complicating factor that points in the other direction is that non-detained 
defendants will be better able to assist in (or even direct) their exoneration than 
those in custody. 
86 Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in 
open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”); see also infra note 88. 
87 See Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 16. 
88 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Central to the plea 
and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant’s 
admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment.”); 
Scheele v. State, 953 So. 2d 782, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that a 
plea colloquy “is a formal ceremony, under oath, memorializing a crossroads in 
the case”).  In some jurisdictions, defendants plead guilty without taking an oath. 
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (“[T]he defendant may be placed under oath, and the 
court must address the defendant personally in open court.”). 
89 Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 16, at 368 (pointing to psychological research 
that supports the intuitive notion that innocent defendants would hold “systemat-
ically more optimistic beliefs than guilty defendants, which make trial prospects 
seem more attractive to the former than they appear to the latter”). 
90 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 135, 143 (2012), 566 U.S. at 135, 143 
(2012); Garrett, supra note 63, at 44. 
91 DEP’T OF  JUSTICE, BUREAU OF  CRIME  STATISTICS, Federal Justice Statistics, 
2015-2016, at 9 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs1516.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EU9M-S78B]. 
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guilty plea while 5,788 came after trial.92  Given this numerical 
imbalance, the relatively infrequent appearance of guilty pleas 
in the false conviction data looks all the more significant.  In 
sum, while the numbers we have may be misleading, as of now, 
they point dramatically in a single direction.93 
The prospect that an “innocence effect”94 substantially in-
fluences guilty plea rates is a perverse sliver of positive news in 
the exoneration data.  Garrett observes in his updated study: 
“Not only do DNA exonerees disproportionately consist of indi-
viduals who had trials . . . but some DNA exonerees endured 
multiple trials, after receiving reversals on appeal or post-con-
viction, before eventually being exonerated.”95  The prevalence 
of trial convictions in the innocence data suggests that the 
evidence rules matter, not only indirectly in shaping plea bar-
gains and settlements, but directly as well.  Despite the well-
documented pressures and distortions in our system,96 it ap-
pears from the data we have so far that a significant portion of 
innocent defendants accused of serious offenses go to trial.  We 
need to look closely at why, in such circumstances, the rules 
fail. 
B. Evidence Rules that Fail the Innocent 
The evidence rules have so far survived the Innocence 
Movement largely unscathed.97  Yet all four of the primary evi-
dentiary contributors to false convictions traverse these 
92 OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., STATE OF TEX. JUDICIAL BRANCH, ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY, at Detail 10 (2016), https://www.txcourts.gov/ 
media/1436989/annual-statistical-report-for-the-texas-judiciary-fy-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HX2B-WURL]. 
93 Investigating this important question, Oren Gazal-Ayal and Avishalom Tor 
scoured a “diverse body of evidence,” including post-conviction interviews, exon-
eration data, and controlled experiments.  Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 16, at 
347.  They conclude that there is a strong “innocence effect.” Id.  Looking at 
similar data, others, like Russell Covey, suggest that the effect is largely an arti-
fact of selection effects. See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of 
Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1164 (2013) (“[T]he fact that so 
many mass exoneration cases were resolved by guilty pleas should erode any 
perception that actually innocent defendants almost uniformly refused to plead 
guilty.”); Garrett, supra note 3, at 152–53 (“Just because few of these exonerees 
pleaded guilty does not mean that wrongful convictions are less of a problem for 
people who plead guilty . . . .”). 
94 Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 16, at 339. 
95 Garrett, supra note 63, at 44. 
96 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2467 (2004) (highlighting the “many structural impediments 
that distort bargaining in various cases”). 
97 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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rules.98  The rule covering expert testimony is regularly recog-
nized in this context.99  This subpart highlights the typically 
unnoticed rules applicable to the other three evidentiary con-
tributors to false conviction.  These rules are uncontroversial 
today.  Yet as the following discussion shows, they arose out of 
eerily prescient historical debates centered on the danger of 
convicting the innocent. 
1. Eyewitness Identifications 
Those who attempt to draw lessons from the exoneration 
data frequently highlight eyewitness identification errors.100 
Garrett’s most recent study finds that 72 percent of convictions 
of innocent defendants involved mistaken eyewitness identifi-
cations.101  Importantly, there are two potential moments when 
the prosecution presents a witness identification to the 
factfinder.  One occurs during the trial itself when the prosecu-
tor asks the witness to point out the perpetrator in court. 
It has long been recognized, however, that in-court identifi-
cations are “unsatisfactory and inconclusive.”102  Given the de-
fendant’s prominent place on the courtroom stage,103  a 
witness’ selection of the person sitting where the defendant sits 
during trial is pro forma.104  John Henry Wigmore articulated 
the long-standing received wisdom as follows: 
Ordinarily, when a witness is asked to identify the assailant, 
or thief, or other person who is the subject of his testimony, 
the witness’ act of pointing out the accused (or other person), 
then and there, is of little testimonial force.  After all that has 
98 For a discussion of those correlates and how they are identified, see infra 
subpart I.B.  For a discussion of the use of the term “correlates” as opposed to 
“causes,” see supra note 18. 
99 See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Foreword: Symposium on Forensic Expert Testi-
mony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459, 1459–61 (2018) (discuss-
ing 2017 symposium conducted by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee 
on Evidence Rules to consider changes to Rule 702). 
100 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78 
(2008) (“The overwhelming number of convictions of the innocent involved eyewit-
ness identification—158 of 200 cases (79%).”). 
101 Garrett, supra note 63, at 46. 
102 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note. 
103 Cf. Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 
92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 575 (2008) (“While a defendant sits in court . . . he is at 
center stage and on display for the jury.”). 
104 30B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & JEFFREY BELLIN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 6762 (2020) [hereinafter WRIGHT & BELLIN] (“The testifying witness should be 
expected to pick the defendant out in most courtroom settings even if unable to 
make an identification in less suggestive circumstances.”). 
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intervened, it would seldom happen that the witness would 
not have come to believe in that person’s identity.105 
As a result of the superficial nature of an in-court identifi-
cation, prosecutors have long sought to introduce more com-
pelling identification evidence in the form of the witness’ pre-
litigation identification of the defendant, typically in some kind 
of lineup.106 
Testimony about prior identifications can take two forms: 
(1) the witness describes the prior identification procedure and 
its outcome; or (2) a police officer who participated in the earlier 
procedure testifies about what transpired.107  The prosecution 
may present both forms of the evidence to maximize its im-
pact.108  Either way, the factfinder learns about an out-of-court 
statement: the witness stating on an earlier occasion, “That is 
the person who robbed me.”109  Since the prosecutor in-
troduces the statement as proof of that fact, it is hearsay.110 
Across the country, prior statements of identification are 
admissible despite the hearsay prohibition.111  States typically 
105 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT 
COMMON LAW § 1130 (1904) (emphasis omitted). 
106 Cf. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967) (“[T]he witness’ testi-
mony of his lineup identification will enhance the impact of his in-court identifica-
tion on the jury. . . .”). 
107 See WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6763 (“[C]ourts commonly allow 
another person to testify about an eyewitness’s out-of-court identification, so long 
as the eyewitness also testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination 
about the identification.”). 
108 Id. 
109 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note (“[I]t falls beyond a 
doubt in the category of prior out-of-court statements.”). 
110 See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c) (defining “hearsay” as a statement made 
outside the current hearing, offered to prove the “truth of the matter asserted” by 
the out-of-court speaker); FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s note (“Some 
nonverbal conduct, such as the act of pointing to identify a suspect in a lineup, is 
clearly the equivalent of words, assertive in nature, and to be regarded as a 
statement.”); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272 n.3 (“The recent trend . . . is to admit the 
prior identification under the exception that admits as substantive evidence a 
prior communication by a witness who is available for cross-examination at 
trial.”); Murphy v. State, 51 S.W. 940, 943 (Tex. Crim App. 1899) (excluding 
evidence of prior identification on grounds that “[t]his was hearsay and 
inadmissible.”). 
111 BARBARA E. BERGMAN, NANCY HOLLANDER & THERESA M. DUNCAN, 2 WHARTON’S 
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 6:13 (15th ed. 2019) (“Most states follow the federal rule.”). 
Some rules, like the federal rules, declare this evidence “not hearsay” (despite the 
fact that it meets the hearsay definition) while others style it an exception. See 
FED R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C); see also discussion infra note 143.  I use “exception” in 
the text because, analytically, the admission of the evidence is an exception to the 
general prohibition of hearsay.  But nothing turns on the word choice.  Nebraska 
used to have no hearsay exception for prior identifications, see State v. Wilson, 
754 N.W.2d 780, 788 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (highlighting absence), but amended its 
code in 2019 to include a provision that mirrors the federal rule. See Legis. B. 
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adopt the formulation in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), 
defining as “not hearsay” an otherwise hearsay statement that 
“identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived ear-
lier,” so long as the declarant testifies.112  There is little modern 
controversy over this rule.113  The Reporter for the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence recently summa-
rized the consensus: “the existing Rule 801(d)(1)(C) is working 
well and should be retained.”114 
The rationale for the admission of out-of-court statements 
of identification tracks its value as compelling prosecution evi-
dence.  As the Ninth Circuit explains: “The reasons for admit-
ting identification statements as substantive evidence are that 
out-of-court identifications are believed to be more reliable 
than those made under the suggestive conditions prevailing at 
trial . . . .”115  The Advisory Committee’s Note to the hearsay 
exception similarly touts the relative superiority of out-of-court 
identifications, and emphasizes that the exception “finds sub-
stantial support” in the pre-rules case law.116 
Other than its potential to convict the innocent, then, all 
seems well with the hearsay exception for prior identifications. 
This wasn’t always the case.  After the Advisory Committee 
proposed the rule with the original Federal Rules of Evidence in 
1971, Congress killed it.117  Senator Sam Ervin, famous for his 
role in the Watergate hearings,118 spearheaded the 
opposition.119 
392, 106th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2019).  For legislative materials on the change, 
see Neb. Legislature, LB392 - Change Hearsay Provisions in the Nebraska Evi-
dence Rules, https://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID= 
37735 [https://perma.cc/HCY3-UC8V] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
112 See FED R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C). 
113 “In practice, Rule 801(d)(1)(C) has proved relatively uncontroversial.” 
Daniel J. Capra, Prior Statements of Testifying Witnesses: Drafting Choices to 
Eliminate or Loosen the Strictures of the Hearsay Rule, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429, 
1445 (2016). 
114 Id. at 1446. 
115 United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1981). 
116 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note. See also David E. 
Seidelson, Third-Party Testimony About Prior Identifications and Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(1)(C): A Petition for Rehearing, 8 REV. LITIG. 259, 260–61 (1989) 
(“Yet, almost all extrajudicial declarations offered to prove the truth of the matters 
asserted therein are made closer in time to the operative facts. Nevertheless, the 
hearsay rule generally excludes such declarations.”) 
117 RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN & JOSHUA DEAHL, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: TEXT AND 
HISTORY xii, 331–33 (2015). 
118 See KARL E. CAMPBELL, SENATOR SAM ERVIN, LAST OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 4 
(2007). 
119 See FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 117, at 331. 
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While proponents of the prior identification exception later 
dismissed Congress’ resistance as a product of confusion about 
the distinction between weight and admissibility,120 Ervin’s op-
position should not be lightly discounted.  Ervin had been a 
trial lawyer, trial court judge, and highly-respected Justice of 
the North Carolina Supreme Court.121  He prided himself on 
being “one of the few lawyers of his generation” who had read 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England 
cover to cover.122  Ervin’s judicial opinions reflect careful atten-
tion to the law.123  One of his most notable opinions draws on 
Wigmore’s canonical evidence treatise to reverse a death sen-
tence, in part, because of the questionable nature of the prose-
cution’s identification evidence.124  Perhaps the most telling 
data point is that North Carolina evidence law, in Ervin’s time 
and to this day, does not include a hearsay exception for prior 
statements of identification.125  Thus, there is no reason to 
think Ervin’s opposition was not well considered.  It was also 
vehement.  Congressman William Hungate later reported that 
Ervin’s opposition to the prior identification exception was so 
fierce that it jeopardized the entirety of the evidence rules pro-
ject.126  Unfortunately, the only memorialization of the opposi-
tion appears in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report that 
killed the proposal, which expresses a cursory “concern that a 
person could be convicted solely upon evidence admissible 
under [the proposed rule].”127 
Ervin retired shortly after Congress passed the legislation 
that enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, without the pro-
posed hearsay exception for prior identifications.128  After his 
retirement, Ervin’s opponents promptly reintroduced the ex-
120 PHILIP A. HART, AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. NO. 
94-199, at 2 (1975) (describing prior objection as “misdirected” because, in part, 
the hearsay “exception is addressed to the ‘admissibility’ of evidence and not the 
‘sufficiency’ of evidence”). 
121 See CAMPBELL, supra note 118, at 43, 69, 77. 
122 Id. at 49. 
123 Id. 
124 State v. Palmer, 52 S.E.2d. 908, 914 (N.C. 1949) (citing JOHN HENRY WIG-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 415, (3d ed.)). 
125 See State v. Patterson, 420 S.E.2d 98, 102 (N.C. 1992) (noting distinction 
between federal and North Carolina law). 
126 121 CONG. REC. 31,866 (reporting colloquy in House that a Senator had 
communicated that “if we did not accept this [stripping out the provision], we 
would not get the bill”); Capra, supra note 113, at 1445 (“[T]he House acquiesced 
to that rejection in order to ensure passage of the Rules of Evidence.”). 
127 WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6761 (referencing S. Rep. No. 194 
(1975)). 
128 Campbell, supra note 118, at 296–97; FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 117, 
at 333. 
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ception and rushed it through Congress.129  (The Senate Report 
justifying reintroduction of the exception frames the renewed 
interest as arising “[u]pon reflection.”)130  The effort succeeded. 
With Ervin out of the picture, Congress reversed course and 
approved the prior identification exception, which went into 
effect a mere three months after the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.131 
The Senate Report on the resurrected prior identification 
exception acknowledged worries about the type of evidence the 
rule could permit, emphasizing an intent to allow only: “non-
suggestive lineup, photographic and other identifications, 
made in compliance with the Constitution.”132  Despite these 
assurances, however, the prior identification hearsay exception 
does not itself screen for reliability—something that would 
have represented a ready compromise between Ervin’s position 
and that of his opponents.  Instead, the rule leaves “compliance 
with the Constitution” as the sole safeguard.133  But the Su-
preme Court has held that constitutional due process con-
straints apply only in a narrow circumstance: when state 
actors manipulate the identification procedure to create “a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”134  As 
explained in the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement 
on the topic: 
In our system of justice, fair trial for persons charged with 
criminal offenses is secured by the Sixth Amendment, which 
guarantees to defendants the right to counsel, compulsory 
process to obtain defense witnesses, and the opportunity to 
cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution.  Those safe-
guards apart, admission of evidence in state trials is ordina-
rily governed by state law, and the reliability of relevant 
129 FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 117, at 333. 
130 S. Rep. No. 94-199, at 2. 
131 FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 117, at 333. 
132 S. Rep. No. 94-199, at 1, 3 (noting as well that evidence “still must meet 
constitutional muster” (emphasis omitted)); H.R. Rep. 94-355, at 2 (1975) (“[T]he 
out-of-court statement of identification must still meet constitutional standards”); 
see also WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6761 n.1 (“Congress stripped the 
proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(C) out of the rules submitted to it by the Supreme Court. 
Congress then promptly added the rule back in shortly after it enacted the original 
Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
133 S. Rep. No. 94-199, at 1. 
134 Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 232 (2012) (quoting Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)); see also id. at 241 (“The due process 
check for reliability, . . . comes into play only after the defendant establishes 
improper police conduct.”). 
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testimony typically falls within the province of the jury to 
determine.135 
Another portion of the Supreme Court’s opinion expressly 
leaves reliability screening of eyewitness identifications to the 
“protective rules of evidence.”136  With the Supreme Court and 
the rules of evidence deferring to each other on the question of 
reliability, most jurisdictions end up with no effective reliability 
screen for out-of-court hearsay identifications.137  The oppo-
nent of the evidence receives only the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant-eyewitness—a witness who may ada-
mantly believe in the truthfulness of the prior identification 
even when mistaken.138 
2. Confessions to Law Enforcement 
Researchers highlight false confessions to police as a sub-
stantial contributor to false convictions.139  In his updated 
study of DNA exonerations, Garrett finds that 21 percent of the 
convictions of innocent defendants involved false confes-
sions.140  The NRE’s most recent report states that a false con-
fession appeared in 13 percent of convictions that led to 
exonerations, including 21 percent of homicides.141 
A prosecutor can most easily lay the foundation for admit-
ting a defendant’s confession through the testimony of the po-
135 Id. at 231–32. 
136 Id. at 233, 245. 
137 My research assistant, Bethany Fogerty, and I reviewed the state ana-
logues and found that most states have rules that are substantially identical to 
the federal variant.  Table on file with author.  A few states (e.g., Connecticut, 
Minnesota and New Jersey) include additional limits on the admissibility of prior 
statements of identification. See, e.g., CONN. CODE EVID. 8-5  (“The identification of 
a person made by a declarant prior to trial where the identification is reliable.”); 
see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d. 872, 919–21 (N.J. 2011) (creating more 
rigorous screening under state constitution); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 
694–95 (Or. 2012) (attempting to construct more rigorous screen of eyewitness 
identification evidence from rules of evidence); supra note 111 (noting the change 
in Nebraska identification laws). 
138 See Gary L. Wells, R. C. L. Lindsay & Tamara J. Ferguson, Accuracy, 
Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 440, 447 (1979) (explaining phenomenon); infra subpart II.C. 
139 Garrett, supra note 100, at 88–89 (“In thirty-one cases (16%), a false con-
fession was introduced at trial. . . . The confessions were particularly powerful at 
trial, perhaps in part because in some cases law enforcement supplied false facts 
to bolster false confessions.”). 
140 Garrett, supra note 63, at 46. 
141 NAT’L  REGISTRY OF  EXONERATIONS, supra note 71, at 11.  The NRE’s 2018 
report collects nineteen new cases involving false confessions out of a total of 151 
new exonerations, or 12.5 percent. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 
68, at 2. 
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lice officer who interrogated the defendant.142  The officer tells 
the jury about the defendant’s incriminating statements, or 
explains the origins of a recording or document memorializing 
the defendant’s words.  The officer’s testimony introduces the 
defendant’s out-of-court statement (“I committed the robbery”) 
as proof of the matter asserted in that statement.  That’s 
hearsay.143 
Following the model of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), 
American jurisdictions reflexively admit confessions, despite 
the hearsay prohibition, as “an opposing party’s statement.”144 
These confessions constitute powerful evidence: “the trial 
equivalent of a deadly weapon.”145  Nevertheless, the Advisory 
Committee emphasizes that “[n]o guarantee of trustworthiness 
is required.”146  The underlying rationale for admissibility is a 
sense of fair play.  “Admissions by a party-opponent are ex-
cluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their 
admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system 
rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay 
rule.”147 
Courts and litigants spend little energy pondering the ad-
missibility of criminal defendants’ statements under the evi-
dence rules.  Modern evidence doctrine offers almost nothing to 
ponder.  “The only question is did the statements come from 
the party’s mouth, pen, keyboard, etc.  If the answer is yes, and 
the statements are offered by the opposing party, the state-
ments qualify for admission . . . .”148  Litigants still fight over 
the admissibility of confessions, of course, but courts funnel 
142 See Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21, (“When the prosecution 
seeks to introduce into evidence a defendant’s confession, invariably it relies upon 
the state’s evidentiary rules regarding admissions of a party opponent.”). 
143 See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c) (defining hearsay).  Through “definitional 
sleight of hand,” the Federal Rules of Evidence redefine such statements, when 
offered by an opposing party, as “not hearsay.” WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, 
§ 6731.  These semantic contortions are required because the statements are, in 
fact, hearsay under the definition of the term. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); cf. 
Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90 (1954) (“Admissions, retold at a trial, are 
much like hearsay, that is, statements not made at the pending trial.”); Leo, 
Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21 (“When the prosecution seeks to intro-
duce into evidence a defendant’s confession, invariably it relies upon the state’s 
evidentiary rules regarding admissions of a party opponent.”). 
144 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
145 United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1984). 
146 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note; Jewell v. CSX Transp., 
Inc., 135 F.3d 361, 365 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Trustworthiness is not a separate re-
quirement for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).”). 
147 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
148 WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6773. 
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these fights through Fifth Amendment criminal procedure 
doctrine.149 
To justify the ready conduit for admission of an opposing 
party’s hearsay statements, the Advisory Committee that 
drafted the federal rules pointed to common law cases doing so, 
and “the apparently prevalent satisfaction with the results.”150 
Oddly, the Committee cites Wigmore as authority on this 
point.151  Wigmore, it is true, stated the general rule in simple 
terms: “Any utterance made by a party . . . asserting any rele-
vant fact, in express words or by implication, and offered 
against the party, is termed an Admission, and is receivable as 
a piece of evidence.”152  But the Advisory Committee’s citation 
is misplaced.  Wigmore followed the general rule with a series of 
limitations on a distinct subset of party-opponent statements, 
“confessions,”153 a topic to which he devoted fifty-two sections 
of his canonical evidence treatise.154  The topic resonated be-
yond the legal academy.  The Chief Justice of the Missouri Su-
preme Court wrote in 1881: “There is no branch of the law of 
evidence in such inextricable confusion as that relative to 
confessions.”155 
The Missouri Chief Justice was alluding to a prominent 
vein of the common law of evidence that required judges to 
screen confessions for reliability.  Courts closely scrutinized 
this “doubtful species of evidence” which “at all times ought to 
149 See infra note 178. 
150 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C) advisory committee’s note. 
151 Id.  The Advisory Committee also cites Edmund Morgan, who similarly 
carves out confessions as a distinct question. See EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC 
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 284 (1962).  The other writer cited by the Advisory Commit-
tee does not discuss the “confessions” debate and seems focused on the civil 
context. See John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and 
Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 484, 579 (1937). 
152 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE’S CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
LAW 201, Rule 128 (3d ed. 1942). 
153 Id. at 203, Rule 130(a) (“The confession of the accused in a criminal case is 
admissible only on the conditions named in Rule 135 . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); 
id. at 217–22, Rule 135 (listing series of limitations designed to ensure reliability 
when a confession was “not made in open Court”). 
154 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT 
COMMON LAW §§ 815–867 (1904); WIGMORE, supra note 105, §§ 815–867, § 1050 
(defining confessions as “a direct assertion, by the accused in a criminal case, of 
the main fact charged against him or of some fact essential to the charge”); see 
also WIGMORE, supra, § 815 (“The situation of a person charged with crime is 
obviously peculiar with reference both to the circumstances under which these 
advantages will be presented, as well as to their nature and force; and thus, in 
history and in principle, statements in the nature of confessions of guilt by an 
accused person stand somewhat apart and call for a separate treatment in the law 
of evidence.”). 
155 State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695, 705 (1881). 
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be received with great caution.”156  Importantly, this restriction 
did not arise from the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  Enforcement of the constitutional privilege 
sought to deter abusive government practices, protecting the 
guilty (whose confessions were true) as much as the innocent 
(whose confessions were false).157  Evidence law’s hearsay-con-
fession doctrine, by contrast, was a common law rule of evi-
dence directed exclusively toward “exclud[ing] self-criminating 
statements which are false.”158  Vexed by the mounting confu-
sion at the turn of the century, Wigmore dedicated a section of 
his treatise to clarifying that under the evidence rule, “a confes-
sion is not rejected because of any connection with the privilege 
against self-crimination.”159 
Wigmore himself despised the common law’s resistance to 
confessions, calling it “an exhibition of sentimentalism toward 
criminals.”160  He rationalized the rule, arising “during the lat-
ter half of the 1700s and the first part of the 1800s,” as “a 
natural reaction from the harshness and unjust severity pre-
vailing in penal administration up to that time.”161  Reminis-
cent of Judge Hand’s skepticism about “the ghost of the 
156 State v. Bostick, 4 Del. 563, 564 (Del. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1845) (“But it 
has been said by some eminent jurists, that, as verbal confessions are so often 
misunderstood or misrepresented, from a want of attention, the improper use of 
language, or the uncertainty of memory, they are at best, but a doubtful species of 
evidence; and at all times ought to be received with great caution.”); see infra note 
167 and accompanying text. 
157 See, e.g., Twining v. State of N.J., 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908) (“It was generally 
regarded then, as now, as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent 
though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded, or 
tyrannical prosecutions.”). 
158 WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 823 (emphasis omitted); see Garrard v. State, 
50 Miss. 147, 151 (1874) (“For the object of all the care which is taken to exclude 
confessions which are not voluntary, is to exclude testimony not probably true.”); 
Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward A Workable 
Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 481 (2005) 
(“The second, distinct confession doctrine that developed in England and the 
Colonies in the decades leading up to the Bram decision was simply a common 
law rule of evidence designed to prevent the introduction of unreliable evidence at 
trial.”). 
159 WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 823.  The section is titled, “Other Theories not 
sanctioned; Self-Crimination Privilege, distinguished.” Id.  It begins: “This princi-
ple of testimonial untrustworthiness being the foundation of exclusion, it follows 
that the exclusion is not rightly rested on certain other possible and occasionally 
plausible theories.” Id. 
160 Id. § 867.  For a critique of Wigmore’s reading of the history, see George C. 
Thomas III & Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle’s Paradox and the Self-Incrimination 
Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 255, & n.65 (1991) (“Wigmore’s analysis 
is, of course, but one reading of the historical data.”). 
161 WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 815. 
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innocent man convicted,”162 Wigmore thought that, in his day, 
“the danger of a false statement induced by an important ad-
vantage” is “of a slender character and the cases of that sort are 
of the rarest occurrence.”163  Nevertheless, the doctrine re-
mained a prominent component of the common law, so Wig-
more dutifully chronicled it, warts and all.164 
The common law’s treatment of confessions presents a re-
markable contrast to present day evidence rules.165  A leading 
English case, Rex v. Warickshall (1783), set out the common 
law doctrine: 
Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmis-
sible, under a consideration whether they are or are not in-
titled to credit.  A free and voluntary confession is deserving 
of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the 
strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof 
of the crime to which it refers; but a confession forced from 
the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, 
comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered 
as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; 
and therefore it is rejected.166 
An early American judicial opinion remarked that the law 
jealously protected against false confessions, such that even 
“telling the prisoner, what he said would be used in his favor on 
his trial,” disqualified any subsequent statements.167  The case 
law includes vivid examples of courts resisting the admission of 
confessions that were not entirely voluntary and thus indispu-
162 See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); supra 
Introduction. 
163 WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 867.  Wigmore goes on to list some of “the most 
notable” examples, including this chilling example: “1660, Perry’s Case, 14 How. 
St. Tr. 1312 (one of two brothers confessed that he, his brother, and his mother 
had murdered his master; they were executed, but two years afterward, the 
master returned home, and explained that he had been kidnapped and sold to the 
Turks; it was never understood why Perry falsely confessed).” Id. § 867 n.1. 
164 Id. §§ 815-867. 
165 For a discussion of modern voluntariness doctrine, see Paul Marcus, It’s 
Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal 
Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 643 (2006) (“Many judges allow confessions 
into evidence in cases in which police interrogators lied and threatened defend-
ants or played on the mental, emotional, or physical weaknesses of suspects.”). 
166 Rex v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234–35; 1 Leach 262, 
263–64) (footnote omitted); see also Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relation-
ship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involun-
tary Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 207–08 (1992) (“At the head of, 
and clearly influencing, the entire line of cases stands Warickshall.”). 
167 State v. Bostick, 4 Del. 563, 564 (Del. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1845) (emphasis 
in original). 
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tably “intitled to credit.”168  In one influential 1783 case, Jacob 
Thompson came under suspicion for passing a forged check.169 
When Thompson could not account for his possession of the 
check to a curious official, the official stated, “unless you give 
me a more satisfactory account I shall take you before a Magis-
trate.”170  Thompson confessed.  The court excluded the con-
fession and acquitted Thompson.171  Its opinion explained: 
“This scarcely amounts to a threat, but it is certainly a strong 
invitation to him to confess. . . . The prisoner was hardly a free 
agent at the time.”172  The contrast is jarring.  If modern Ameri-
can courts, like the Seventh Circuit in the Dassey case, applied 
this “free agent” language in weighing the admissibility of con-
fessions, false confessions would all but disappear from exon-
eration narratives.173 
Paradoxically, the pinnacle of the hearsay confession doc-
trine in the United States came in an opinion that sowed the 
seeds of its demise.  In an 1897 Supreme Court case, Bram v. 
United States,174 the Supreme Court unreservedly embraced 
the doctrine.  The Court’s opinion reads to the modern ear like 
a revolutionary tract: 
But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and 
voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of 
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied 
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper 
influence . . . . [T]he law cannot measure the force of the 
influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the 
prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree 
of influence has been exerted.175 
Suggesting a full embrace of the common law’s “sentimental-
ism toward criminals,”176 Bram cites the Thompson case sum-
168 Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. at 234–35. 
169 Rex v. Thompson (1783) 169 Eng. Rep. 248, 248; 1 Leach 291, 291. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 249. 
172 Id.; see generally Herman, supra note 166, at 198–99 (discussing lengthy 
history of Rex v. Thompson). 
173 See Dassey, 877 F.3d at 304 (“[T]he Supreme Court allows police interro-
gators to tell a suspect that ‘a cooperative attitude’ would be to his benefit.”); see 
also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979) (rejecting challenge to confes-
sion elicited from sixteen-year-old who “wept during the interrogation” and where 
“police did indeed indicate that a cooperative attitude would be to respondent’s 
benefit”). 
174 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
175 Id. at 542–43 (quoting 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 
(6th ed. 1896)). 
176 WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 867. 
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marized above and incorporates that case’s hyper-protective 
“free agent” language.177 
Most significantly, however, the Bram Court described its 
analysis as “controlled by . . . the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”178  This observation was 
historically inaccurate.179  Wigmore sharply condemned 
Bram’s language: “[N]o assertions could be more presump-
tuously unfounded. The history of the two rules . . . shows that 
there never was any connection or association between the 
constitutional clause and the confession-doctrine.”180  Alas, 
the Supreme Court outranks even Wigmore, and its error 
would prove calamitous for innocent defendants. 
As Wigmore emphasized, at the time of the Bram decision 
there were two prominent sources of authority regulating the 
admission of confessions: (1) an evidence rule focused on relia-
bility and (2) a constitutional rule focused on process.  A useful 
contrast can be drawn to modern English law which, as in the 
common law tradition that it shares with the United States, 
directs judges to exclude confession based on two distinct 
grounds: (1) “oppression” of the accused, and (2) unreliabil-
ity.181  In the United States, only the first ground survives. 
The Supreme Court’s motives were likely otherwise, but by 
conflating what had previously been separate doctrines, the 
Court’s opinion in Bram steered American analysis of the ad-
missibility of confessions away from reliability-based evidence 
law and into process-focused Fifth Amendment doctrine.  Over 
177 Bram, 168 U.S. at 551–52, 564 (noting that “the statements of Bram were 
not made by one who, in law, could be considered a free agent”). 
178 Id. at 542–43 (“In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wher-
ever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, 
the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD 
H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(a) (4th ed. 
2019) (“In the 1897 case of Bram v. United States, the Court appeared to adopt the 
‘radically different approach’ of basing exclusion upon violation of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the Court later pulled back 
from that position.”) (footnotes omitted)). 
179 See Godsey, supra note 158, at 478 (critiquing Bram because the cases it 
relied on “are historically unrelated to the self-incrimination clause”). 
180 WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 823 n.8; cf. Herman, supra note 166, at 171 
(identifying consensus that Wigmore “was historically correct”). 
181 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 76(2) (UK) (barring 
admission of confession made by an accused person if the prosecutor cannot 
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was not obtained: “(a) by 
oppression of the person who made it; or (b) in consequence of anything said or 
done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreli-
able any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof”). 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 33  4-MAR-21 9:58
R
337 2021] THE EVIDENCE RULES 
time, Fifth Amendment doctrine became less protective, domi-
nated by Miranda warnings182 and the notoriously permissive 
constitutional voluntariness analysis applied in the Dassey 
case.183  Once entangled with the constitutional inquiry, what 
remained of the common law’s reliability-focused evidence rule 
slowly bent toward process-focused constitutional doctrine, 
and then vanished entirely.  The precursors to modern evi-
dence law, the American Law Institute’s 1942 Model Code of 
Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, included 
hearsay rules specific to “confessions.”184  The Federal Rules of 
Evidence, by contrast, contain no reference to confessions at 
all—a position that spread to the States along with the wildly 
popular Federal Rules.185 
As the Innocence Movement uncovers the danger of unreli-
able confessions, the “branch of the law of evidence”186 that 
once severely restricted their admission is now a historical cu-
riosity.  Eighteenth century common law cases invoked a pure 
version of voluntariness (“free agent”) that bears no resem-
blance to modern American conceptions.187  And, most impor-
tantly, the common law cases referenced this pure form of 
voluntariness as a means of ensuring reliability, not a substi-
tute for it.188  “Confessions [were] received in evidence, or re-
jected as inadmissible, under a consideration whether they are 
or are not intitled to credit.”189  Now, the sole remaining screen 
182 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966). 
183 See supra Introduction (discussing Dassey case); cf. Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (identifying one of “[t]he purposes of the safeguards 
prescribed by Miranda” as “free[ing] courts from the task of scrutinizing individual 
cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were 
voluntary”); Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21, at 790 (“Miranda fails to 
offer any meaningful protection against the elicitation of false confessions or the 
admission of false and unreliable confessions into evidence at trial.”). 
184 See AM. L. INST., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 238–45 (1942) (Rule 505 “Con-
fessions”); Uniform Rules of Evidence, in 62 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFER-
ENCE MEETING 161, 201 (1953) (Rule 63(6) “Confessions”). 
185 See Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867, 
872 (2018) (noting spread to states).  Some vestiges remain, such as a longstand-
ing provision in Georgia state law. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-824 (West 2020) (“To 
make a confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being 
induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”); cf. 
Earp v. State, 55 Ga. 136, 137 (1875) (quoting statutory language). 
186 State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695, 705 (1881). 
187 See, e.g., Rex v. Thompson (1783) 169 Eng. Rep. 248, 249; 1 Leach 291, 
293 (characterizing a defendant as “hardly a free agent” at the time their confes-
sion was coerced). 
188 Id. 
189 Rex v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234; 1 Leach 262, 263.  Since 
the focus was on reliability, not police misconduct, Warickshall emphasized that a 
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on confessions—constitutional law—explicitly rejects inquiries 
into reliability. Miranda doctrine requires warnings not relia-
bility.190  As for the constitutional voluntariness inquiry, the 
Supreme Court has said: “the reliability of a confession has 
nothing to do with its voluntariness.”191  After co-opting the 
common law hearsay confession rule over a century ago in 
Bram v. United States, the Court now declares, without any 
hint of irony, that the reliability of confessions is “a matter to be 
governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum.”192 
3. Confessions to Jailhouse Informants 
According to Garrett’s study, 22 percent of the convictions 
of DNA exonerees involved false informant testimony.193  The 
questionable confession must be excluded while physical evidence that stemmed 
from the confession was properly admitted. Id. at 235 (“This principle respecting 
confessions has no application whatever as to the admission or rejection of facts, 
whether the knowledge of them be obtained in consequence of an extorted confes-
sion, or whether it arises from any other source; for a fact, if it exist at all, must 
exist invariably in the same manner, whether the confession from which it is 
derived be in other respects true or false.”). 
190 See GARRETT, supra note 3, at 39–40 (“[T]he Supreme Court has ruled out 
reliability as a reason to exclude a confession . . . .”); Thomas & Bilder, supra note 
160, at 277 (explaining that Miranda “rejected . . . the reliability of the confession 
. . . as [a] test[ ] of coercion”); cf. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972) 
(asserting that under Miranda, “evidence is kept from the trier of guilt or inno-
cence for reasons wholly apart from enhancing the reliability of verdicts”). 
191 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 384–85 (1964); see also Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1961) (“[T]he question whether Rogers’ confessions 
were admissible into evidence was answered by reference to a legal standard 
which took into account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity. And this is 
not a permissible standard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” (footnote omitted)).  In an earlier case, the Supreme Court refer-
enced the “unreliability of the confession” as a possible lens through which to 
reject the admission of a confession of a suspect who was “insane and incompe-
tent at the time he allegedly confessed.”  Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 
207 (1960).  But that reference seems overwhelmed at this point in light of the 
Court’s more recent, repeated, and more direct, statements to the contrary. Das-
sey, 877 F.3d at 317 (discussing case law and observing that “it is not unreasona-
ble to interpret Connelly as foreclosing” an inquiry into reliability). 
192 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); cf. Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & 
Taslitz, supra note 21, at 764 (“Most state courts continue to apply federal due 
process criteria to evaluate the admissibility of confession evidence, yet perversely 
these criteria are concerned exclusively with the so-called voluntariness, not the 
reliability, of confession evidence.”). 
193 Garrett, supra note 63, at 46; see also ROB  WARDEN, CTR. ON  WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS, THE  SNITCH  SYSTEM: HOW  SNITCH  TESTIMONY  SENT  RANDY  STEIDL AND 
OTHER  INNOCENT  AMERICANS TO  DEATH  ROW 3 (2004) (“That makes snitches the 
leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases—followed by errone-
ous eyewitness identification testimony in 25.2% of the cases, false confessions in 
14.4%, and false or misleading scientific evidence in 9.9%.”), https:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/SnitchSystemBook-
let.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP3M-U7HE]. 
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most notorious variants of this evidence involve witnesses who 
emerge from the local jail and, in return for concessions in their 
own cases, testify that they heard the defendant confess.194 
The NRE reports that “eight percent of all exonerees in the 
Registry were convicted in part by testimony from jailhouse 
informants,” with this evidence “concentrated among the worst 
crimes,” appearing in 15 percent of all murder exonerations.195 
Some of the concerns about reliability raised by the confes-
sions-to-police context also apply to confessions to jailhouse 
informants.  A Georgia judge writing in 1876 saw a straightfor-
ward application of the common law’s reliability-based restric-
tion to informant-relayed confessions: 
What motives may have induced this witness, who was seek-
ing a pardon for his own criminal conduct, to extort confes-
sions from the defendant no one can tell, and the only safe 
rule in such cases is . . . to . . . reject all evidence of confes-
sions whenever the same are induced by another, by the 
slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury.196 
Jailhouse informants and other cooperating witnesses who 
testify about a defendant’s confession also highlight a more 
modern dilemma in the law of evidence.  The primary concern 
in this context is not that the informant pressured the defen-
dant to falsely confess, but that the informant fabricated the 
defendant’s confession entirely.197 
The typical response to concerns about live-witness per-
jury highlights the opponent’s ability to discredit the wit-
ness.198  When a distrusted witness relays the statements of 
194 Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the Crim-
inal System, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 992–93 (2008) (“Criminal informants—i.e., 
criminal offenders who receive lenient treatment because of their cooperation with 
the government—are a longstanding and important part of the criminal system.”). 
195 Snitch Watch, NAT’L  REGISTRY  EXONERATIONS (May 13, 2015), http:// 
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Jailhouse-Informants.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/XQN9-FKPX]. 
196 Stafford v. State, 55 Ga. 591, 596 (1876) (emphasis omitted) (citing GA. 
CODE  ANN. § 24-8-824, which codified the common law doctrine discussed in 
supra section II.B.2). See also supra note 185.  The statement is that of the judge 
who authored the opinion in the case, but the judge then states that the majority 
of the court did not agree with the sentiment. Stafford, 55 Ga. at 596–97. 
197 Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrong-
ful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 108 (2006) (“Police and prosecu-
tors, in turn, often do not and cannot check these lies because the snitch’s 
information may be all the government has.  Additionally, police and prosecutors 
are heavily invested in using informants to conduct investigations and to make 
their cases.”); Natapoff, supra note 194, at 999 (“Informant unreliability is exacer-
bated by secrecy, making mistakes harder to discern and errors easier to conceal 
after the fact.”) 
198 See infra note 199. 
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another person, the opponent can call the other person to tes-
tify and refute any falsely attributed statements.  Party oppo-
nents can employ this strategy more easily than most, since 
they are the other person.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
sums up the sentiment as follows: “[A] party can hardly com-
plain of his inability to cross-examine himself. A party can put 
himself on the stand and explain or contradict his former state-
ments.”199  The drafters of California’s influential evidence 
rules justify admission of party opponent hearsay statements 
on the same grounds: “The rationale underlying this exception 
is that the party cannot object to the lack of the right to cross-
examine the declarant since the party himself made the state-
ment.  Moreover, the party . . . can explain or deny the pur-
ported admission.”200 
199 Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406, 420 (Pa. 1999) (quoting PA. R. 
EVID. § 805); see also Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 (D.C. 1988) 
(“With admissions, a usual objection to the use of hearsay—the inability to cross-
examine the declarant as opposed to the witness hearing the hearsay—is not 
present, since the declarant is himself a party to the litigation and therefore ‘has 
the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former asser-
tion.’”); Globe Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 91, 95 (2004) (citing 
Wigmore) (“In other words, the hearsay rule is satisfied; [the declarant] has al-
ready had an opportunity to cross-examine himself . . . or (to put it another way) 
he now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and 
explain his former assertion.”); State v. McClaugherty, 133 N.M. 459, 466 (2003) 
(overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 275 P.3d 110, 121 n.6 (N.M. 
2012)) (“An opposing party may introduce out-of-court statements made by its 
opponent under the theory that the declarant party is in court and has the 
opportunity to deny or explain such statements.”); State v. Richardson, 195 N.C. 
App. 786, *5 (2009) (“A defendant is free to take the stand and explain, deny, or 
otherwise address the statement.”); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 
1157 (Pa. 2006) (quoting PA. R. EVID. § 805); cf. Jones v. Nat’l Am. Univ., 608 F.3d 
1039, 1045 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Once the [statement] was admitted [as the statement 
of a party-opponent], NAU had the opportunity to explain, rebut, or deny its 
substance to reduce its evidentiary value for the jury.”); Devenyns v. Hartig, 983 
P.2d 63, 69 (Colo. App. 1998) (“On the other hand, admissions or statements of a 
party-opponent are not classified as hearsay because the need to admit such 
statements as a part of the adversary system outweighs the concerns for trustwor-
thiness underlying the exceptions to the hearsay rule.”); State v. Harberts, 848 
P.2d 1187, 1191 n.10 (Or. 1993) (“Unlike statements by other persons, a party 
can hardly object to the admissibility of his own statements, or of statements 
attributable to him, on the ground that he had no opportunity to cross-examine 
himself or that he is unworthy of belief.  The party-opponent is considered to have 
an adequate opportunity to explain or deny the contents of any such 
statements.”). 
200 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1220 (West 2020), law revision commission’s comments. 
Cf. HLC Props., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 105 P.3d 560, 565 (Cal. 2005) (“While not 
binding, the Commission’s official comments reflect the intent of the Legislature 
in enacting the Evidence Code and are entitled to substantial weight in construing 
it.”).  The even-more-influential drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence cite 
California’s section 1220 in their explanation of the federal rule. See FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2)(A) advisory committee’s note. 
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Unlike other party opponents, however, a criminal defen-
dant’s ability to rebut incriminating statements is highly cir-
cumscribed.201  The rules surrounding defendant testimony 
punish testifying and reward silence: 
The Supreme Court has permitted severe burdens to be 
placed on the right to testify, while prohibiting the placement 
of equivalent burdens on the right to remain silent at 
trial . . . . [A] properly advised defendant who wishes to testify 
must consider not only the numerous legal burdens that at-
tach should he do so, but also the many court-created bene-
fits of remaining silent that will be foregone.202 
The result of this imbalance can be seen in the large num-
ber of defendants who plead not guilty, insist on a trial, and 
then decline to testify on their own behalf.  “In modern times, 
only about half of criminal defendants take the witness 
stand.”203  Perhaps most striking is that this percentage only 
changes modestly for defendants later proven innocent. John 
Blume studied this phenomenon and reports that 39 percent of 
factually innocent defendants did not testify.204  A comparison 
of this finding to the roughly 50 percent generic non-testifying 
rate for criminal trials,205 suggests that “factual guilt is a fac-
tor, but not a powerful determinant of a defendant’s decision to 
testify.”206 
Instead, the factors that seem to most powerfully influence 
the decision whether to testify are tactical, often influenced by 
evidence rules.  The primary factor concerns the admissibility 
of prior convictions.207  Blume reports that 91 percent of the 
201 “There is less concern about trustworthiness, especially in civil cases, be-
cause the party against whom the statements are offered generally can take the 
stand and explain, deny, or rebut the statements.”  Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 
1123, 1128 (7th Cir. 2013). 
202 Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal 
Rules That Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 863 (2008). 
203 Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 397 (2018) (citing 
studies); see Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the 
Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial 
Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1373 tbl.2 (2009) (summarizing findings from 
the broad study of felony trials). 
204 John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Re-
cord—Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 489 
(2008).  Garrett’s online database presents a similar figure (35.15 percent). See 
Convicting the Innocent, Did Defendant Testify?, DUKE L.: CTR. SCI. & JUST., 
https://www.convictingtheinnocent.com/graphics/did-defendant-testify/ 
[https://perma.cc/46YL-S73Q] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
205 Bellin, supra note 203. 
206 Id. at 430. 
207 See id. (citing studies); Cassell, supra note 5, at 849 & n.208 (citing email 
from Sam Gross) (citing NRE statistics regarding criminal record of wrongfully 
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later-exonerated defendants who did not testify “had prior con-
victions that potentially could have been used for impeachment 
purposes.”208  The predominant practice in American jurisdic-
tions is that a defendant’s prior criminal convictions are not 
admissible unless the defendant testifies.209  Blume again: “In 
every single case in which a [later exonerated] defendant with a 
prior record testified, the trial court permitted the prosecution 
to impeach the defendant with his or her prior convictions.”210 
Thus, it is not a satisfying answer to the ready admissibil-
ity of dubious informant-relayed confessions that the defen-
dant can “put himself on the stand and explain or contradict 
his former statements.”211  The rules of evidence penalize de-
fendants who take the witness stand and reward those who 
remain silent.  The problem is not just theoretical. Empirical 
evidence suggests that, for both guilty and innocent defend-
ants, these rules “substantially damage[ ] defendants’ chances 
for acquittal.”212  But only defendants who are willing to forgo 
the benefits of trial silence and accept the many burdens of 
testifying can directly challenge lying informants.213  And de-
fendants who decline to take that risk suffer a “silence penalty” 
that is inevitably exacerbated by jurors’ assumptions about the 
reaction innocent defendants “should have” to a false accusa-
tion that they confessed.214 
This takes us full circle.  In trying to rationalize the com-
mon law courts’ historical reluctance to admit confessions, 
Wigmore highlighted defendants’ inability to testify at common 
law. 
In view of the apparent unfairness of a system which practi-
cally told the accused person, “You cannot be trusted to 
speak here or elsewhere in your own behalf, but we shall use 
convicted, that “of those with prior-record data, 647 (42%) had a prior felony 
conviction, 163 (11%) had a prior misdemeanor conviction, 30 (2%) had a prior 
juvenile felony conviction, and 13 (1%) had a prior juvenile misdemeanor 
conviction.”). 
208 Blume, supra note 204, at 490. 
209 See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts 
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 292 (2008) (“The admission of prior convictions is now a 
well-established and virtually routine part of federal (and most state) criminal 
proceedings in which a defendant with a criminal record takes the witness 
stand.”). 
210 Blume, supra note 204, at 490. 
211 Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406, 420 (Pa. 1999) (quoting PA. R. 
EVID. § 805). 
212 See Bellin, supra note 203, at 406, 417, 426. 
213 Id. 
214 See id. at 426. 
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against you whatever you may have said,” it was entirely 
natural that the judges should employ the only makeweight 
which existed for mitigating this unfairness and restoring the 
balance, namely, the doctrine of confessions.215 
In light of the modern realities surrounding defendant tes-
timony, an evidentiary effort aimed at “restoring the balance” 
may again be needed. 
C. The Apparent Insignificance of the Most Infamous 
Evidence Rules 
The data on false convictions offer another important in-
sight for evidence policymakers.  Many of the most frequently 
litigated and debated evidence rules do not appear to play a 
direct role in convicting the innocent.  If a core goal of evidence 
law is preventing such convictions, this finding hints at the 
need for a shift of attention. 
Some of the most heated controversies in the modern evi-
dence landscape involve evidence of uncharged crimes admit-
ted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) or innovative 
variants like Rules 413 and 414.216  As Ed Imwinkelried ex-
plains: “Rule 404(b) has generated more published opinions 
than any other subsection of the Federal Rules.  In many juris-
dictions, alleged errors in the admission of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence are the most common ground for appeal in 
criminal cases.”217  The prohibition on character evidence and 
215 WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 865.  Illinois recently enacted a statute in this 
vein. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-21(d) (West 2020) (“The court shall 
conduct a hearing to determine whether the testimony of the informant is reliable, 
unless the defendant waives such a hearing. If the prosecution fails to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the informant’s testimony is reliable, the court 
shall not allow the testimony to be heard at trial.”). 
216 See Dora W. Klein, The (Mis)application of Rule 404(b) Heuristics, 72 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 706, 709 (2018) (describing Rule 404(b) as “perhaps the most con-
troversial”); Eileen A. Scallen, Proceeding with Caution: Making and Amending the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 601, 610 (2008) (“The most controver-
sial of the recent Evidence Rule changes was the addition of Rules 413-415 . . . .”). 
217 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged 
Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Charac-
ter Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 577 (1990) (footnote omitted); see 
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note to 1991 Amendment (“Rule 404(b) 
has emerged as one of the most cited rules in the Rules of Evidence.”); United 
States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Rule 404(b) has become the 
most cited evidentiary rule on appeal.”); State v. Rutchik, 341 N.W.2d 639, 649 
(Wis. 1984) (Abrahamson, J. dissenting) (“This case is another in the ever-increas-
ing number of cases interpreting the rule excluding other crimes evidence, the 
most litigated rule of evidence.”); Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Crimi-
nal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 211 (2005) (offer-
ing statistics to show that “[n]o other evidentiary rule comes close to this rule as a 
breeder of issues for appeals”). 
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accompanying conduits for admission of prior misconduct, 
however, are notably absent from the false conviction 
narrative.218 
Similarly, the celebrity hearsay exceptions that scholars 
(and judges) love to hate generate lots of heat but do not get so 
much as a cameo in the false conviction research.  Academic 
literature and judicial opinions spotlight the questionable relia-
bility of evidence admitted under notoriously defendant-un-
friendly hearsay exceptions, like the exception for statements 
against interest,219 coconspirator statements,220 and dying 
declarations.221  Judge Richard Posner recently caused a stir 
when, drawing on academic critiques, he attacked the hearsay 
exceptions for excited utterances and present sense impres-
sions.222  These rules are all missing from the reports on “what 
went wrong” in false convictions.  The recently strengthened 
(and then weakened) Confrontation Clause receives great fan-
fare in scholarship and judicial opinions, but seems to play 
little role in false convictions.223 
Perhaps the answer is that these hotly-debated evidence 
rules do play a role in false convictions, but researchers over-
looked the evidence rules while combing through voluminous 
trial records.  A key witness’ testimony could contain hearsay 
and other objectionable material, but, without a trial objection, 
the role of the evidence rule would be obscured.  And a litigant 
218 The sole exception is the narrow use of character evidence permitted by 
Rule 609, which allows impeachment of a testifying defendant with prior convic-
tions. See supra section II.B.3. 
219 See, e.g., WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6992 (“[T]he Rule 804(b)(3) 
exception is one of the most controversial in the rules of evidence.”); John P. 
Cronan, Do Statements Against Interest Exist? A Critique of the Reliability of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and a Proposed Reformulation, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2002) (describing psychological factors that undermine the assump-
tions of the rule and arguing that “research and common experience reveal myriad 
reasons why persons make untrue, self-incriminating statements”). 
220 See, e.g., Comment, Reconstructing the Independent Evidence Requirement 
of the Coconspirator Hearsay Exception, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441–42 (1979) 
(“Substantial controversy exists as to whether the coconspirator hearsay excep-
tion is actually founded upon the reliability of the evidence and whether cocon-
spirator declarations are in fact credible.” (footnote omitted)). 
221 See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang, Shortcuts to “Truth”: The Legal Mythology of Dying 
Declarations, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 237–43 (1998) (highlighting scientific 
evidence that casts doubt on the reliability of statements of the dying). 
222 See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J. 
concurring); Liesa L. Richter, Goldilocks and the Rule 803 Hearsay Exceptions, 59 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 906 (2018) (“Judge Richard Posner dropped a bombshell 
on traditional hearsay doctrine in a 2014 concurrence in United States v. Boyce.”). 
223 See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 
92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1866–71 (2012) (summarizing Confrontation Clause 
changes and debate). 
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might decline to object if the evidence is clearly admissible. 
(Juries don’t like overly-objecting attorneys).224  Even with an 
objection, a researcher searching for more powerful, and per-
haps more obviously false, evidence, could understandably 
gloss over seemingly minor evidentiary objections.225  More evi-
dence-rules-focused research is needed.  That said, it is un-
likely that, across the run of cases misleading evidence of guilt 
coming in through controversial evidence rules (like dying dec-
larations or uncharged misconduct) would regularly go unno-
ticed by litigators, and then researchers. 
A more intriguing hypothesis is that, for some of the same 
reasons that they are widely litigated and debated, the more 
infamous evidence rules do not admit the kind of evidence that 
generates false convictions.  Character evidence rules, like Rule 
404 for example, may create enough of a hurdle to exclude the 
most spurious propensity evidence, while only admitting dam-
aging evidence that either correlates well with factual guilt or is 
readily discounted by the factfinder. 
More generally, the most notorious evidence rules may well 
be admitting faulty and prejudicial evidence (in addition to val-
uable evidence of guilt).  But the faulty evidence they admit 
may be transparently unreliable.  Juries may intuitively under-
stand that when a live witness tells them what a curiously 
absent witness purportedly said, that evidence must be taken 
with a serving of salt.226  Similarly, if the prosecution attempts 
to establish someone’s guilt of crime X by introducing evidence 




The surprising connections between the evidence rules and 
false convictions signal the need for a shift in the focus of 
policymakers and scholars.  The rules that appear to misfire 
224 See 3 LANE GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 13:8 (3d ed. 2019) (“It is generally 
accepted that jurors resent the attorney who makes an excessive number of 
objections.”). 
225 Garrett, supra note 100, at 96 tbl.5 (observing that state law evidence 
claims were the most frequent claim raised by innocent defendants on appeal). 
226 See Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psycholog-
ical Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 885 (2015) (reporting based on empirical studies 
“that jurors spontaneously discount hearsay evidence, even when that evidence is 
not subject to cross-examination”).  Note that this same instinct might not apply 
when the “absent” declarant is the defendant who is often sitting silently in the 
courtroom and, even when testifying, is saddled with a strong transparent bias in 
favor of acquittal. 
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most in the quest for truth are absent from modern debates 
about evidence policy.  And while these rules reflect resolutions 
of once-hotly-contested policy disputes, they have become so 
deeply woven into the fabric of American evidence doctrine that 
they are almost invisible today.  False convictions research 
suggests that these unnoticed rules, and not more familiar 
(and more controversial) provisions, endanger innocent defend-
ants who elect to go to trial.  This novel insight points the way 
to important new areas for scholarship and commentary and 
potentially fertile grounds for reform. 
Moving forward, the research on false convictions spot-
lights two broad areas where evidence policymakers should 
reflect on the need for changes.  The first is the ready admissi-
bility of party opponent hearsay statements in criminal cases. 
The rationale for essentially unchecked admissibility of this 
form of hearsay is anomalous in that, unlike virtually every 
other hearsay exception, it explicitly disclaims any connection 
to reliability.227 
Party opponent statements can be introduced under mod-
ern hearsay doctrine regardless of the possibility or even likeli-
hood that those statements are unreliable.  This policy choice 
becomes especially problematic as DNA exonerations reveal its 
substantial impact on the falsely accused, the precise group 
the rules are supposed to protect.228  The only built-in reliabil-
ity-protection for party opponent statements, whether offered 
through a police officer or a jailhouse informant, is the ability of 
the declarant-defendant to take the witness stand and explain 
or refute a purported confession.  Modern criminal procedure 
and evidence rules, however, burden the criminal defendant’s 
decision to take the witness stand with a series of unfavorable 
legal and tactical consequences.229  The result is a perfect 
storm of potential unreliability.  Prosecutors will commonly be 
able to introduce unreliable evidence of defendants’ confes-
sions in trials where the defendant-declarant never takes the 
stand to explain or refute that confession.  This leaves the jury 
227 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note (emphasizing that “[n]o 
guarantee of trustworthiness is required”).  The other example of a hearsay excep-
tion that is not based in some argument for reliability is Rule 804(b)(6), forfeiture 
by wrongdoing.  That rule allows the introduction of hearsay where the party 
against whom the hearsay is offered wrongfully and intentionally caused the 
declarant’s absence from the proceeding. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . 
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not 
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.”). 
228 See supra subpart II.A. 
229 See supra section II.B.3. 
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in a precarious position of trying to evaluate the reliability of 
these critical out-of-court statements without either of the nor-
mal tools for evaluating out-of-court statements offered for 
their truth: an evidentiary rule that screens out unreliable 
statements or live examination of the declarant. 
Another place for evidence policymakers to look to incorpo-
rate lessons from the false convictions research is the admissi-
bility of out-of-court statements of identification.  The fallibility 
of eyewitness identifications is one of the primary lessons of the 
Innocence Movement.230  And just as traditional tools for en-
suring reliability stumble when false confessions are intro-
duced at trial, those tools can be ineffective in counteracting 
unreliable statements of identification.  As already discussed, 
the rules of evidence contain no reliability screen for out-of-
court identifications.231  The only reliability-enhancing protec-
tion is the requirement that the declarant testify.  But, as the 
social science literature shows, cross-examination may be par-
ticularly unhelpful in this context because the witness is typi-
cally mistaken, not lying.232 Eyewitnesses typically harbor no 
recognizable bias or motive to falsely accuse the defendant. 
And the mistake may be counterintuitive to jurors who under-
standably empathize with the victims of serious crimes and 
seek to validate their claims, particularly when endorsed by the 
police and prosecution, that the defendant is the 
perpetrator.233 
Reformers inspired by the Innocence Movement seek to 
remedy the failings of both misidentifications and false confes-
sions through increased attention to police procedures, expert 
testimony, jury instructions, and criminal procedure.234  Each 
of these responses suffers from weaknesses.  There are 
thousands upon thousands of police departments with varying 
dedication to implementing improved identification and inter-
230 See supra section II.B.1. 
231 Id. 
232 See Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, supra note 138 (summarizing and explain-
ing research); cf. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230–31 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1985) (“To the extent that a mistaken witness may retain great confidence in an 
inaccurate identification, cross-examination can hardly be seen as an effective 
way to reveal the weaknesses in a witness’ recollection of an event.”). 
233 See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1230–31 n.6; Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, supra 
note 138. 
234 See Meghan J. Ryan & John Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the Tools of 
Wrongful Conviction, 68 SMU L. REV. 1073, 1111–12 (2015) (detailing efforts and 
arguing that “more can be done on this front”). 
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rogation procedures.235  In addition, eyewitness identification 
mistakes and false confessions often arise from human fallibil-
ity, and not the malevolent designs of police.236  As a result, 
they cannot be eliminated even with the best investigation pro-
cedures.  Expert testimony, while likely beneficial,237 is not 
readily available;238 and juries can shrug off experts as overly 
academic and removed from the “real world” of serious crimes 
and sympathetic victims.239  Jury instructions can seem legal-
istic and get easily lost in the sea of other instructions.240 
Criminal procedure protections based in vague constitutional 
provisions like the Due Process Clause struggle to gain traction 
with skeptical courts.241  Given these weaknesses, an evi-
dence-rule-based, reliability screen for prior identifications and 
hearsay confessions offers a promising alternative avenue for 
reform. 
Changes to the evidence rules offer numerous advantages 
for reformers.  The core goal of the Innocence Movement is 
promoting accuracy, which parallels the primary goal of the 
evidence rules.242  Hearsay exceptions, in particular, are in-
235 See Jon Greenberg, How Many Police Departments Are in the United 
States?, POLITIFACT (July 10, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/punditfact/state-
ments/2016/jul/10/charles-ramsey/how-many-police-departments-are-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/C38C-QHR3] (“If you include every college campus security 
department, tribal land unit, sheriff office, local police department, state police, 
and every federal agency, you get to 17,985.”). 
236 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 232 (2012) (emphasizing dis-
tinction between suggestive identifications created by police and those, “in which 
the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law enforcement officers”). 
237 See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accu-
racy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 817, 840 (1995) 
(summarizing evidence). 
238 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Constructing Evidence and Educating Juries: The 
Case for Modular, Made-in-Advance Expert Evidence About Eyewitness Identifica-
tions and False Confessions, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2015) (cautioning that 
expert testimony “is simply not an approach that can feasibly be used in the very 
large number of cases” because “[e]xperts are simply too few in number and too 
expensive to be able to be called in as many cases as they would have meaningful 
relevance”). 
239 Id. at 1845. 
240 See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A 
New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1061 (1995) (“[J]ury 
instructions often work better in theory than they do in practice.”); Penrod & 
Cutler, supra note 237, at 834 (“In summary, the experiments reviewed above 
provide little evidence that judges’ instructions concerning the reliability of eye-
witness identification improve juror decision making.”). 
241 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 243–47 (2012); supra section 
II.B.1. 
242 See Zalman, supra note 5, at 1335 (discussing primary goals of Innocence 
Movement, including “decision accuracy”); supra part I.A (discussing goals of the 
evidence rules). 
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tended to foster accuracy, ensuring that, in contexts where 
juries struggle to separate out-of-court truth from fiction, only 
reliable evidence is introduced.  And unlike constitutional 
criminal procedure rules, hearsay exceptions need not target 
flaws of law enforcement procedures.243  A hearsay exception 
can focus unapologetically on the issue that matters most to 
innocent defendants: reliability (not process).  And it can be 
directly tailored to the causes of false convictions.  Finally, evi-
dence rules need not purport to be dictated in their precise 
parameters by vague constitutional provisions like “due pro-
cess.”  Typically crafted by expert committees, evidence rules 
can include fine-grained requirements unapologetically tied to 
interdisciplinary research and policy considerations. 
The last and perhaps most important implication of this 
Article’s audit of the evidence rules extends beyond any of the 
specific rules of evidence discussed above.  The growing body of 
research on false convictions presents a blueprint for a general 
reevaluation of evidence rules and doctrines.  The evidence 
most likely to generate false convictions seems to fit a pattern: 
a victim’s earnest but mistaken selection of the defendant out 
of a lineup of potential suspects; a police officer’s matter-of-fact 
testimony about an out-of-court confession; an expert’s avun-
cular testimony that a bite-mark could not have come from 
anyone other than the defendant.  The common problem is not 
just that this evidence is unreliable.  Rather, a key ingredient of 
critical evidence-rule failures appears to be a specific type of 
unreliability that eludes the wisdom of lay jurors.244  This no-
tion resonates with a prominent, but contested, vein of evi-
dence theory that the true challenge for a system of evidence is 
not unreliable evidence, but unreliable jurors.245  This sug-
243 See supra subpart II.B (describing Supreme Court’s restrictions on consti-
tutional intervention to circumstances involving police misconduct). 
244 See Findley, supra note 19, at 727 (suggesting that “factfinders tend to 
misapprehend the risks inherent” in evidence that leads to wrongful convictions); 
Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21, at 774 (explaining that confessions 
and their flaws “are outside the realm of common experience”). This may be a 
distinction between the various types of evidence referenced in this Article. As-
suming appropriate disclosures, jailhouse informant testimony (unlike other 
forms of evidence discussed) may be a form of testimony that jurors intuitively 
discount. See Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 510 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Brady requires 
prosecutors to disclose any benefits that are given to a government informant, 
including any lenient treatment for pending cases.”). 
245 Cf. State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43, 56–57 (Ariz. 2001) (Martone, J. concur-
ring) (“I do not believe that jurors need to be protected from themselves. In my 
experience, jurors quite properly separate the wheat from the chaff.”); Learned 
Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 LECTURES ON 
LEGAL TOPICS 89, 100–01 (1926) (highlighting reverential reliance on juries in most 
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gests a final, overarching takeaway.  Perhaps the rules of evi-
dence could better achieve their purpose if instead of lightly 
policing all evidence for reliability flaws, they aggressively 
targeted the less common, but more damaging, forms of evi-
dence that contribute to inaccurate verdicts. 
CONCLUSION 
A bedrock assumption of the American criminal justice 
system is that trials produce accurate results.246  A “full-dress 
criminal trial with its innumerable constitutional and statutory 
limitations upon the evidence that the prosecution can bring 
forward” is the “gold standard of American justice.”247  The 
cases highlighted by the Innocence Movement tarnish that 
standard.  With important flaws exposed, it falls to scholars, 
judges, and policymakers to examine the research on false con-
victions and assess what went wrong. 
In conducting this assessment, it is important to recognize 
that a substantial portion of the evidence that condemns inno-
cent defendants shares a curious thread: it passes through a 
typically-overlooked evidence rule that could, but does not, 
protect against unreliable evidence.  Presenting an unsettling 
contrast, rules that do get lots of attention seem oddly uncon-
nected to the narratives of false convictions.  As conviction of 
the innocent is the worst outcome for an accuracy-focused evi-
dence regime,248 it follows that we should start paying more 
attention to the neglected rules of evidence implicated in false 
convictions, and less to the highly-contested rules that are not. 
A shift in attention does not mean that any particular rule 
must be changed.  Evidence rules require a balance.  Cor-
recting too far in favor of admission or exclusion of evidence 
can reduce the likelihood of accurate verdicts across the broad 
run of cases.  Still, in fine tuning the evidence project, it helps 
to be looking in the right places.  The National Transportation 
Safety Board investigates the statistically rare disasters to find 
contexts, as inconsistent with rules’ distrust of their ability to evaluate hearsay 
evidence); Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and 
the “Search for Truth” in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1996) 
(highlighting tension between “exalting” the jury and the “elaborate rules . . . 
devised to keep relevant evidence from the jury on the ground that it might be too 
prejudicial”). 
246 See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) 
(“The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.”). 
247 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 186 (2012) (Scalia, J. dissenting); cf. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (similar language). 
248 See supra subpart I.A. 
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out what went wrong, rather than the vast majority of unevent-
ful flights.249  Evidence policymakers too should examine false 
conviction data for failures of the evidence rules.  Evidence 
rules—which focus directly on fostering the accuracy of ver-
dicts—are a logical, but so far overlooked next stop for the 
Innocence Movement. 
249 See Adam M. Gershowitz, An NTSB for Capital Punishment, 47 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 151, 160 (2014) (describing NTSB’s responsibilities). 
